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ABSTRACT 
National interests and plans for the future play an important role in 
international relations. Because the Middle East encompasses one of the most 
important resources – oil, ongoing events in the area have impacted world 
economic conditions. For this reason, this thesis touches on the Iraqi economic 
situation after the 2003 invasion, since it plays a crucial role in the global 
economy and security. Beginning with the wrong policies of the Baath regime in 
the pre-invasion period, this thesis continues with the main problems of Iraq in 
the economic realm, then focuses on the three neglected issues—the informal 
economy, deterioration in social capital, and the insurgency and criminal gangs. 
All of these issues require great attention to build and maintain a secure and 
stable environment in Iraq. Then, the thesis gives some lessons learned to date, 
and solution propositions as strategies at the local level. It then concludes with 
general strategic points to look at in the future.  
During the thesis research, the latest formal reports were used to reveal 
the current situation in Iraq. Scholarly interpretations were cited from various 
scholars to evaluate the aftermath of the 2003 invasion in Iraq in broad sense.  
Finally, this thesis emphasizes the required remedies for a better Iraqi 
economy, and possible future expectations from U.S. decision makers. 
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National interests and plans for the future play an important role in 
international relations. Because the Middle East encompasses one of the most 
important resources – oil, ongoing events in the area have impacted world 
economic conditions. And, because Iraq has the world’s third largest reserves of 
oil, its role in the world’s economy is particularly critical regarding the future of the 
world’s economic stability. Since the economic stability of Iraq will be critical in 
determining that country’s recovery, this thesis will examine those factors and 
conditions likely to result in the development of a strong, viable economic system 
in that country. 
Specifically, through scrutinizing events and then revealing the 
consequences of the current economic structure in Iraq, the general question of 
this thesis is: what was the economic situation in Iraq after the invasion in 2003, 
what has happened to date, and what can be done to develop the Iraqi 
economy? More broadly, the economic issues that have been neglected to date 
and their effects on the economic consequences will be surveyed. The author 
concludes that Iraq must struggle against many diverse issues in order to build a 
stable and prosperous economy. To achieve better results in establishing that 
economy, foreign powers should execute tangible and objective steps to support 
Iraq. Thus, it may well be easier to convince not only Iraq’s people, but foreign 
entrepreneurs to invest and bring the Iraqi economy into the global arena. 
However, environmental factors such as violence, lack of security, and 
uncertainty for the future affect those possibilities. In order to reveal the 
consequences of economic debt, some important factors such as the informal 
economy, the effects of the insurgency, the lack of a governmental central 
authority in controlling corruption, and damage in social capital will be examined. 
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B. IMPORTANCE 
After five years of conflict and political uncertainty, economic factors are 
likely to become more and more important in creating an environment for stability 
in that war-torn country. Numerous approaches have been attempted to restart 
the economy, yet the results to date have been disappointing. The results of 
research undertaken for this thesis should break new ground by identifying a 
strategy that is expected to have a good chance at success. Clearly, if a solid 
economic foundation is established, the pull of the insurgency should lessen, and 
with that, hope for the future of Iraq should increase. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Iraqi population, in general, 
has been living under the poverty line. Looking back to the last century, the 
government in Iraq was not able to establish a legitimate nation-state system. 
Actually, today’s problems at the state level were inherited from the wrong 
policies of former Iraqi leaders. It is apparent that the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein left behind many problems that require deliberate effort, responsibility, 
and a long-term strategy to be solved. 
Looking at the 1970s, Iraq was in a good situation in terms of economic 
conditions. However, the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, and the two years following 
the invasion of Kuwait plunged the Iraqi economy into a great recession.1 
Because Saddam Hussein’s government exploited oil revenues to hold power, 
the infrastructure, agriculture, and other crucial job sectors were neglected. Thus, 
it became inevitable for Iraq to become dependent mostly on oil for income. The 
reliance and access to oil revenues created huge economic differences among 
the Iraqi people. As a consequence, the other job sectors have not developed as 
they should have; the needs of the government and the people were met by huge 
amounts of imported goods. This situation seemed to reveal that a qualified labor 
                                            
1 Abbas Alnasrawi, Iraq’s Burdens: Oil, Sanctions, and Underdevelopment, (London: 
Greenwood Press, 2002), 62-64. 
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force was not necessary. However, when oil income diminished suddenly, the 
country went into turmoil. Apparently, most of the GDP was dependent on oil 
revenue, and the declining oil revenue has affected the inflation rate and the lack 
of industrial improvement has caused people to look for alternative income 
resources, which have emerged as an informal economy.  
It appears that the problems of Iraq, in terms of economic recession, have 
created a multi-functional phenomenon. After the invasion in 2003, those 
problems resulted in catastrophic consequences. The Iraqi post-war economy fits 
the descriptions of several models: “Transition economy, failed state, rentier 
economy, post-conflict economy, and failed-take off economy.”2 Those models 
cover almost all of the problematic areas in the Iraqi economy. The thesis 
author’s assessment, based on scholarly interpretations and executed policies, 
concludes that establishing a free-market system in Iraq can pave the way 
toward joining the global economy. Building a secure environment and rebuilding 
a legitimate economic system may appeal to foreign investors, reduce the 
insurgency, and control corruption. Getting away from an oil revenue-dependent 
state can give opportunities to improve the other job sectors, decline 
unemployment, diminish an informal economy, and decrease the vast authority of 
the central government in the economic arena. All of these solutions have some 
resemblance in terms of executed policies. However, in this thesis, while 
evaluating the current situation from the “god view” as an epitomized survey, the 
effects of the insurgency, the informal economy, and the effects of deterioration 
in social capital in the financial sector will be argued in detail. 
D. ACADEMIC DEBATES 
Executed policies and implementations in Iraq, since the invasion in May 
2003, reveal that objectives have not been reached successfully. Maybe some 
improvements or some implementations, including great efforts for a better 
                                            
2 Robert Looney, “Failed Economic Take-Offs and Terrorism in Pakistan: Conceptualizing a 
Proper Role for U.S. Assistance,” Asia Survey, XLILV, no. 6 (2004): 771-793. 
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prospect of economic structure have been made; however, it is difficult to say 
that those policies work properly today. To expect better results, a secure and 
stable environment can and should encourage all public and privatized sectors. 
In the article published in 2004, Christopher Foote, William Block, Keith Crane, 
and Simon Gray argue that, “Reconstruction spending will create jobs and raise 
incomes this year, but sustained economic growth will depend on whether Iraq's 
future leaders pursue the pro-market approaches that the Coalition has 
advocated. If the Iraqi economy is to reach its potential, it will need to go even 
farther than the Coalition did, implementing some reforms that the Coalition did 
not pursue because of security concerns.”3 
To evaluate the outcomes of the invasion, it is crucial to scrutinize the 
tangible consequences of economic data:  
After the end of hostilities, the greatest effect of the 2003 war on 
Iraq's economy was the subsequent decline in oil and electricity 
production. Oil production had been running at 2.5 million barrels 
per day before the war. It dropped to near zero in April; exports 
ceased until June 2003. Electricity generation fell by about 25 
percent, regaining pre-war levels in October 2003. Based in part on 
these figures, the International Monetary Fund (2003, p. 22) 
estimates that Iraq's GDP fell by about 22 percent in dollar terms 
for 2003.4  
One year later, in 2005, the “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq” was 
published; it explains the economic objectives that refer to the aforementioned 
consequences. The strategic approach for better results in economics was 
explained: 
Our efforts have focused on helping Iraq restore its neglected 
infrastructure so it can provide essential services to the population 
while encouraging economic reforms, greater transparency, and 
accountability in the economic realm. The international community 
has been instrumental in these efforts, but there is room for the 
                                            
3 Christopher Foote and others, “Economic Policy and Prospects in Iraq,” The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 3 (2004): 48. 
 4 Ibid., 55. 
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international community to do more. Foreign direct investment, over 
time, will play an increasing role in fueling Iraq’s economic growth.5 
On the other hand, evaluated results and ongoing economic life in Iraq 
reveal that those objectives have not been reached. Emphasizing those 
consequences, Robert E. Looney argues as follows: 
The Coalition’s failures were marked by a very different set of 
conditions. Failure often coincided with high social cost. For 
instance, the coalition’s inability to end fuel price subsidies reflected 
its fears of sparking mass unrest. Also, most failed initiatives were 
afflicted by security disruptions, such as looting and sabotage that 
precluded sustained progress. Lack of powerful patrons was 
another handicap typical of unsuccessful projects. For instance 
plans for agricultural reconstruction languished with a committed 
CPA sponsor. Funding problems also characterized failed projects. 
Many projects ran into disabling delays when they encountered the 
complex U.S. government procurement process.6 
Because the invasion has been ongoing for eight years, lessons learned 
from what has been accomplished or failed in terms of economic results, can be 
a vital legacy, which can be used as guidance for the future. Robert Looney gives 
those lessons in several headlines; each of them includes vast purposes:  
• “Reconstruction entails painful trade-offs rather than easy choices;  
• high hopes and lofty promises are no substitute for sound planning 
and prudent expectations;  
• control expectations to realistic levels; 
• for any actions, develop several contingency plans;  
• economic reconstruction depends upon adequate security; yet 
security depends on successful reconstruction;  
                                            
5 The White House, National Security Council, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq 2005, 
November 2005, 22, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf (accessed May 5, 
2008). 
6 Robert Looney, “The Economic Challenge: Building a Viable New Iraq,” In after the Dictator: 
the Rebirth of Iraq, edited by Barry Rubin. New York: M.E. Sharpe, (2007): 8. 
 6
• reconstruction requires coordination of short-term initiatives and 
long-term structural reforms;  
• don’t over-rely on market forces in a conflict setting; 
• ongoing reforms require empowered owners;  
• broad-based participation is critical for maintaining reform 
momentum, but requires overcoming centralization tendencies;  
• overcoming and controlling corruption is extremely difficult.”7 
 
Exploiting those learned lessons paves the way for integrating the Iraqi 
economy into the global field, and more broadly, opens a new window for the 
steps of a transformation process. Thus, a sense of achievement regarding 
economic progress can be gained by implementation of the following 
suggestions: 
“Political inclusion and consensus-building; 
Establishing professional security forces; 
Tackling corruption; 
Creating a transparent and efficient oil sector;  
Developing a solid budgetary framework; and  
Improving governance by building and consolidating effective national 
institutions.”8 
As mentioned above, political outcomes and dynamics will determine what 
kind of objectives can be achieved in the short, medium and long run. Although 
contemplated projects and plans define “what should be done,” the current  
 
 
                                            
7 Looney, “The Economic Challenge: Building a Viable New Iraq,” 9-11. 
8 Ibid., 21. 
 7
political milieu at that time will be a crucial factor in determining what is possible. 
These general ongoing issues cover almost all the frustrated areas of the 
economic situation. 
E. PRE-INVASION PERIOD 
Before the invasion, Iraq witnessed some wrong governmental policies. It 
can be said that two main factors played significant roles in Iraq’s developing 
process, since its independence. The first one is its geographic location, which 
gives a good opportunity for a prosperous economy because of having the third 
largest oil reserves in the world, and the other one is its demographic shape, 
which has caused many obstacles in terms of building a stable nation-state 
system for many years. Looking at the past, it is important to focus on the 
importance of oil revenue, and the misbehaviors of the Saddam Regime 
regarding governing the country for its own benefits, since its establishment. 
The oil industry in the Middle East was shaped according to the trade 
policies of major oil companies, especially after the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire. Moreover, these major companies’ relations with oil resources 
engendered new improvements in terms of the oil industry, and close 
connections emerged among the countries that have oil-rich territories in the 
Middle East, and international economic regulations.9 Focusing on Iraq, five oil 
companies exploited the oil resources there: “British Petroleum, Exxon, Mobil, 
Shell, and Compagnie Francaise des Petroles.”10 However, since oil revenue has 
been the most important source of income for the Iraqi government, dependence 
on oil income—thus on these oil companies—became necessary in this manner. 
From this phenomenon, being dependent on foreign companies in an economic 
arena reveals that the expenditures should be planned according to the amount 
of income, and the relations with these companies, including their political 
behaviors. Strategies of the oil companies in the Middle East have great effects 
                                            
9 Alnasrawi, Iraq’s Burdens: Oil, Sanctions, and Underdevelopment, 19. 
10 Ibid. 
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on shaping the economic future of those oil-producing countries. A concession 
system and those companies’ joint behaviors, in terms of oil prices, have been 
two major factors.11 
Looking to the past, the relations of the Iraqi government with oil 
companies seemed volatile; disagreements with those companies sometimes 
showed up as low oil production. As a vital settlement, Iraq built its own oil 
company in order to regulate and understand national oil policy in its territory.12 
Improvements and investments in this field developed Iraq’s social and industrial 
sides. However, the Iran-Iraq War and then the invasion of Kuwait caused terrible 
consequences in the economic field, thus oil production could not stay in a 
stabilized trend, but decreased dramatically in these periods.13 In fact, the main 
cause of the invasion of Kuwait can be interpreted as an offensive economic 
behavior of Saddam Hussein, since interdependence on oil companies was 
affecting the development level of oil-producing countries. 
Thus, the invasion of Kuwait became inevitable. Shortly afterward, the 
consequences of that invasion affected the economy of Iraq; the United Nations 
Security Council imposed an embargo on Iraq, and that situation paved the way 
for the other oil-producing countries to increase their oil production.14 
What happened between 1950 and 1990 in terms of economic 
implementations in Iraq seems almost as devastating; strategies and investments 
in an economic field, within political decisions, were not collaborated in a 
plausible manner. Relying on oil production income only and ignoring the other 
investment sectors, such as agriculture and industry, made the Iraqi economy 
dependent almost completely on one resource, and although required investment 
programs were scheduled, more than half of those ad hoc investment funds were 
                                            
11 Alnasrawi, Iraq’s Burdens: Oil, Sanctions, and Underdevelopment, 25. 
12 Ibid., 26. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 31-33. 
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not spent. 15 Therefore, the agriculture and industry sectors have not developed 
much. Due to the high percentage of the population of Iraq that were working in 
rural areas, investing in agrarian sectors would be a crucial factor. Also, ignoring 
investments in rural areas affected the industrial field, which affected the 
prospect of Iraqi development in the long run. In a nutshell, in this 
aforementioned period, the behaviors of Iraqi governments for a better usage of 
income, depending on oil production, did not change, and improvements in the 
economic and political arenas could not be achieved. 
Why the economic situation and the level of life have been volatile and 
terrible in Iraq, especially after the beginning of Iran-Iraq War, lie on the Iraqi 
governments’ insistence on increasing its oil-production income, and their 
neglecting policies over the other production sectors of Iraq. Disappointing 
results in the Iran-Iraq War for Iraqi governance caused a dramatic decline in 
economic and social life standards. More broadly, at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, 
Iraq plunged into a turmoil that was caused by destroyed industrial fields, a 
damaged oil exporting system, the lack of privatization, an increased level of 
inflation, and the proliferation of unemployment.16 Additionally, in, preparing its 
military force for the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi government increased its military 
expenditures, and that situation created an imbalance between income and 
expenditures.17 Finally, the consequences of this war were devastating; Iraq did 
not witness what it expected and focused on increasing its oil revenue in order to 
relieve its economy from suffering. However, the Iraqi government accused the 
Gulf States of manipulating a decline in oil prices, which had a further negative 
effect on the Iraqi economy.18 Furthermore, since Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates did not agree with Iraq about increasing oil prices per barrel, Saddam 
                                            
15 Alnasrawi, Iraq’s Burdens: Oil, Sanctions, and Underdevelopment, 38-43. 
16 Ibid., 62. 
17 Ibid., 61-63. 
18 Ibid., 64. 
 10
Hussein decided to invade Kuwait on August 2, 1990.19 Since the economic 
power of Iraq was weak after the Iran-Iraq war, that invasion exacerbated its 
political and economic situation, especially when United Nation Security Council 
executed sanctions. The purposes of those sanctions were withdrawal of Iraqi 
military forces from Kuwait borders, and maintaining a secure environment in the 
Middle East. The strategy of the United States Air Force was to destroy the main 
facilities of the adversary, and damage the public’s morality.20 Public view 
against the current government would be hatred and many grievances. Besides 
those attacks, the sanctions that were imposed on the economic and social fields 
exacerbated the atmosphere of Iraq; many people—especially children—died 
because of the lack of medical supplies. Criticizing that situation out of the scope, 
it is apparent that the U.N. Security Council did not show enough of a response 
to the Iraqi citizens’ terrible situation. As a dramatic explanation, it was argued 
that, “even when the Sanctions Committee eventually recognized the existence 
of urgent humanitarian needs in Iraq in March 1991, nothing was done to alter 
the situation. This meant that the bulk of the enormous food needs of the Iraqi 
people—more than 10,000 tons per day of food grain alone—were unmet.”21 
It is apparent that it was mostly oil revenue and the wrong foreign policies 
of the Ba’ath regime that changed the fate of Iraq, It was especially Saddam 
Hussein’s authority over the Iraqi citizens, and his foreign policy in the Middle 
East, that brought Iraq into turmoil. Those incorrect policies left a legacy that 
requires an essential strategy and much time to rebuild Iraq as a stable country. 
While doing that, it is important to figure out the main requirements for the Iraqi 
economy. 
                                            
19 Alnasrawi, Iraq’s Burdens: Oil, Sanctions, and Underdevelopment, 64. 
20 Ibid., 66-67. 
21 Ibid., 73. 
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F. GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
Today, the general situation in Iraq is uncertain in every facet of life, 
including the economic, social, political and demographic areas. The level of 
economy reflects how the things are going in Iraq. Because economy includes 
immense factors regarding a country’s development level, here a few general 
problems will be touched on here. More broadly, three neglected issues—the 
informal economy, the insurgency and criminal gangs, and deterioration in social 
capital—will be emphasized in detail. Then, with a look to the future, what kind of 
lessons have been learned since 2003, what kind of strategies have been 
executed at the local level, and what can be done more for a better future will be 
evaluated. Finally, a short summary will conclude the main points, and look for 
future expectations.  
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II. FACTORS EXACERBATING THE PROBLEMS OF THE 
IRAQI ECONOMY 
A. GENERAL PROBLEMATIC AREAS AND STRATEGIES 
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 has left diverse consequences, which in turn 
affect the current life, and make the close future uncertain in many cases. 
Although the purpose of the invasion was to impede global terrorism, the 
aftermath of this action has not convinced the global vision. Five years after the 
invasion, economic results have not shifted to a prosperous level like other 
problematic areas, such as security and the stabilization of central governance. 
More broadly, implementing the planned strategies regarding economic 
development steps have not reached what was aimed for, although some 
success has been achieved. Actually, Iraqi citizens are hesitating about the 
achievement of the economic development projects on time, because of some 
obstacles.22 According to the U.S inspector general, the improvement programs 
have been impeded by “violence, corruption and mismanagement.”23 So, the 
efforts in that case do not seem to work well, since the money left for rebuilding 
development plans appears to be wasted because of mismanagement and an 
insecure environment.24 That situation has affected the planned strategies 
regarding the prosperous economy, especially for short term economic 
improvements that have been impeded by those obstacles.  
Looking at the roots of these problems, Saddam Hussein’s legacy in the 
economic arena seems to be lingering. Also, that regime’s uncertain and wrong 
economic policies, and misleading economical behavior has exacerbated the 
                                            
22 Robert Looney, “Impediments to Stability in Iraq: The Illusive Economic Dimension,” 
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.12, No.1 (2008): 26. 
23 Tom Regan, “US Inspector General for Iraq Paints ‘Grim’ Picture of Reconstruction Effort,” 
Christian Science Monitor, November 1, 2005, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1101/dailyUpdate.html (accessed July 12, 2008). 
24 Ibid. 
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general situation with “internal conflicts, wars, and sanctions.”25 Therefore, it 
would not be easy to cope with this legacy; great efforts have been made for 
recovering and amending the negative impacts of weakening forces, which had 
been concrete for years.26 Those efforts include, “…the restoration of 
government economic functions, after looting and state collapse; the prevention 
of currency collapse, hyperinflation, and economic chaos; the rebuilding of 
infrastructure ravaged by war, sanctions, looting, and neglect; the rehabilitation of 
a health care system cut off from medical advances for two decades; the 
dismantling of corrupt, dysfunctional state economic controls; and the stimulation 
of the growth of a private sector that had been stunted by government 
interference.”27 
The coalition met some difficulties regarding the pre-planned economic 
aims because of some obstacles. At the time of the invasion, the Coalition 
Provisional Authority could not impede the illicit infrastructure, be successful in 
impressing the foreign entrepreneurship, execute economic development 
strategies, rebuild state-owned sectors, and support the creation of job 
opportunities.28 Those failed policies have played an exacerbating role in terms 
of future plans in the economic realm. Although Saddam Hussein was 
overthrown, expectations have not been met because of the aforementioned 
impediments. Parallel to this, there were other problematic areas, such as 
electricity production, and combating corruption, which are the key points for 
multipurpose solutions. More broadly, the U.S. Congress could not spend more 
than $18.4 billion for the rebuilding of problematic areas.29 
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Many of the problems in the economic field were engendered and 
worsened because of misperceptions and wrong policies after the war.30 As an 
explicit result, oil production consists of approximately 74 percent of the GDP.31 
Dependence on oil revenue weakened the other industrial and agricultural 
sectors, and that situation affected the investment sectors and productivity of the 
Iraq in a negative way.  
Another huge obstacle in this vein was the creation of falsified prices of 
production due to intervening by the central governance into economic life.32 
Thus, the misrepresented prices plunged economic results into inefficiency, and 
recession became inevitable. That consequence then diminished the role of 
private sectors in the economic field.  
Furthermore, looking at the social life reveals that there is an unfair 
situation in every facet of living. These include “health, education, public 
services, and social services to low-income groups, the disabled, internally 
displaced persons, and other vulnerable groups across geographic areas.”33 
Explicitly, unemployment is too high, thus poverty is also widespread. Because 
turmoil is a prominent factor, it is almost impossible to lessen unemployment 
without regulations to secure the environment. Overall, economic prosperity 
seems unlikely to increase rapidly; the rate of income for an average family 
decreased dramatically. A United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
household survey suggests that while the richest 20 percent of the population 
earns close to half of the income (approx.44 percent), the poorest 20 percent of 
the population earns 7 percent of the income.34 So it is apparent that most of the 
Iraqi population is living under the poverty line. The social structure in Iraq plays 
                                            
30 Robert Looney, “The Viability of Shock Therapy in Iraq,” Challenge, Vol. 47, No. 5, 
(September-October 2004): 86-103. 
31 Looney, “Impediments to Stability in Iraq: The Illusive Economic Dimension,” 27. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 28. 
34 Ibid. 
 16
an exacerbating role in this consequence. Uncontrolled business opportunities 
and informal relations with the central authority pave the way for economic 
recession. Thus, for the near future, without crucial changes in social life, those 
dramatic unbalanced income statuses are likely to remain for some time. 
B. INITIAL ECONOMIC PROBLEM STRATEGIES 
After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, initial strategies regarding a prosperous 
economy could not be successful because of unsuitable approaches. Since the 
environment in Iraq was not suitable for economic reconstruction 
implementations, the expectations could not be achieved. The Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) decided to execute a neo-liberal approach in terms of 
economic developments, however, the planned implementations could not fit the 
current Iraqi economy because of the lack of a secure and stabilized 
environment.35 Actually, a neo-liberal approach comes with the empirical data 
and tangible plans that demand solving the problems on a very concrete ground. 
However, in the CPA’s development plan, there were some crucial absent points 
regarding reshaping the economy: “A sound legal system for contracts, a 
functioning financial sector, and the initial absence of a national currency.”36 
Without these critical supportive elements, expecting better results would be 
unrealistic. In addition, a neo-liberal approach aims to use private investment in 
order to exploit the financial gains with the assistance of free market prices.37 
However, the central authority, lack of regulations in legal systems, and the 
insecure atmosphere social life have caused the investors and entrepreneurs to 
keep themselves away from economic investments. 
There is a general idea about the neo-liberal approach, that it is not 
suitable for finding job opportunities or the recuperation of the economy, but it 
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often results in expenditures that result in increased regional and personal 
income disparities.38 Thus, this situation causes regional inequality, and lack of 
economic growth, and lack of beneficial recovery steps engender skeptical 
approaches in the public’s mind against executed implementations. Parallel to 
this, Sabri Zire al-Saadi argues that, “In Iraq, without economic vision and 
realistic policies, the goodwill of spending efforts may end in chronic structural 
problems, high inflation, leading to political and social disturbances. As a matter 
of fact, since the war ended, the implemented economic measures and the actual 
expenditures have neither increased domestic production and productive 
employment, nor improved the living standards of the majority of the people.”39 
Thus, it is apparent that the consequences of implementations were the result of 
CPA miscalculations. 
One of the CPA miscalculations was the de-Ba’athificaiton program, which 
was implemented in May 2003 by the CPA.40 Although the program was aimed 
at eroding the negative effects of Saddam’s legacy, executed policies 
exacerbated the ongoing situation. Approximately 120,000 people became 
jobless.41 However, many of them had been in a good career positions, such as 
doctors, professors, nurses and other skill-required sectors; their purpose in 
joining the Ba’ath Party was to get opportunities in their professions, live better, 
and not to support the Ba’athist ideology.42 As expected, many crucial sectors in 
productive fields were damaged, and incomes decreased the consuming rate, 
which affected the other trade sectors negatively.43 More broadly, the 
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educational system was damaged by the de’Ba’athification rules due to many 
professors being dismissed from universities such as Basra, Baghdad and Tikrit; 
and the vantage point of the education system was severely destroyed because 
of the lack of scholars, who were very good citizens. 44 But, although it was a 
delayed action, L. Paul Bremer III, head of the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional 
Authority, shifted his prejudiced ideas about the many Ba’athist scholars, and 
allowed them to get their jobs back again.45 
Another effort of the CPA was to rebuild the Iraqi economy and to 
opportunities to Iraqi companies. By doing that, the CPA hoped that Iraqi firms 
would exploit the allocated aid by the U.S, which included $18.6 billion.46 But, 
due to the lack of enough capital, no Iraqi companies could take advantage of the 
opportunity, and the benefits the CPA offered went to foreign companies who did 
have the required capital.47 Rebuilding projects could not be successful as far as 
getting money to Iraqi entrepreneurs and this situation again dismayed the Iraqis 
because of poverty and the uncertainty of the future. 
Actually, the intent of the de-Ba’athification program was    “justice, 
accountability, reconciliation, and economic compensation.”48 However, both the 
aforementioned consequences and initial benchmark assessment reports verified 
that although a few implementations been successful, expected results could not 
be fully achieved.49 
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C. INTERNAL MIGRATION 
Another devastating consequence of the unstable environment after the 
invasion is increased internal migration, which has exacerbated the social and 
economic situation in Iraq. According to the report of the International 
Organization for Migration (IoM), because of the sectarian treatment, 
approximately 1.4 million Iraqis decided to move to a safe environment.50 That 
movement also affected the demographic structure of Iraq and had a negative 
effect on the public’s morale. Actually, this movement began in 2003, with the 
movements of considerable average and high-level business operations to Arab 
countries. Thus, the situation caused lots of Iraqi workers to leave Iraq. 
Furthermore, this movement played a vast role in terms of increasing uncertainty 
in the economic realm. The main purpose of that increasing migration was having 
a secure environment, and living without sectarian violence. Looking at Northern 
Iraq, except for the Kurdish Regional Government zone, diverse sectarian 
provinces such as Diyala, Nineveh and Ta’mim (Kirkuk) are typical examples of 
problematic areas in terms of economic consequences. In Sunni areas, many 
Sunnis have left multi-sectarian communities to go to heavily populated Sunni 
provinces, and many non-Sunnis have had to leave those provinces. In Baghdad, 
relocated people have multiplied by two since February 2006. In the central and 
southern provinces, many of the Shia have abandoned Baghdad and moved to 
the nine heavily Shia-populated provinces of central and southern Iraq.51 Those 
replacements, in different regions of Iraq, have exacerbated the Iraqi economy, 
by reducing the opportunity of having a local job, accessing healthcare and fuel, 
and increased inflation rates for prices of food and merchandise.52 Because of 
these consequences, some precautions have been taken. For example, Karbala 
now makes it mandatory for new residents to prove that they have neighbors to 
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support them.53 The results may not be recognized in the short-term, but that 
kind of local restriction can hopefully be a successful step for local stabilization, 
which makes economic stability more likely. 
 
Table 1.   Internal Migration54 
D. UNEMPLOYMENT 
After the invasion in 2003, the living standards of Iraqi citizens declined 
suddenly because of the damaged employment sectors. Economic recession 
affected the income rate of the people, and the jobless bulge has increased 
dramatically. According to the July 2003 chairman’s report, “unemployment in 
Iraq is estimated to be over 60 percent. Business leaders and independent 
economists assert that the employment situation has deteriorated considerably in 
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the aftermath of the war.”55 Thus, handling the rebuilding process makes it 
necessary to convince the citizens of Iraq to create job opportunities in order to 
execute tangible implementations regarding a better economy in the future. 
These tangible implementations could not be met at the period just after the 
invasion in 2003, as state-owned enterprises proved incompetent in the 
economic field.56  
The aftermath of destroying the Iraqi army revealed a worse-case 
scenario in terms of the unemployment problem. When the CPA decided to 
dismiss the army personnel, this decision proliferated the unemployment rate, 
and created tension and hatred among the young jobless soldiers. The 
unemployed 300,000 former soldiers became a great potential risk, not only as 
an obstacle for economic and political improvements, but as a danger to U.S. 
security precautions.57 This situation, in turn, has exacerbated the security level 
of the environment of Iraq, and paved the way to the proliferation of illegal 
activities in the following years. More broadly, the high unemployment rate has 
caused a favorable milieu for potential volunteers to join criminal gangs and 
militias, and the lack of basic services in lots of provinces was a big trump to well 
organized adversary groups to take over the roles of government.58 These 
problems still exist today. Parallel to this, according to the Crisis Group Middle 
East Report, “Iraq faces a huge unemployment problem, not just involving former 
insurgents but generally among the young population, Sunni or Shiite. This will 
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need to be addressed if only to prevent young Iraqis from being drawn into 
militias, insurgent groups or criminal gangs.”59 
It should be noted that according to some statistics, the unemployment 
rate in Iraq seems lower than it really is. According to the World Bank Report in 
2005, some surveys show that the unemployment rate is 30 percent, however, 
overall unemployment is around 50 percent.60 Furthermore, some data may 
create controversial situations. According to the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) estimations, unemployment is between 18% and 30%; however, if salaries 
are compared with the basic living standard requirements, unemployment 
between the sixteen and thirty-year-old age groups is around 40–60 percent, 
especially in problematic areas.61 There is no doubt that unemployment 
exacerbates social life in Iraq, and does not bode well for counterinsurgency 
strategies and precautions against criminal activities. 
E. INFLATION 
One of the economic consequences of the invasion of 2003 is that it 
negatively affected inflation. Like the other deteriorated sectors of the Iraqi 
economy, the increased inflation rate is exacerbated by criminal activities, 
violence, and corruption, where these obstacles have caused increasing prices 
and constraints in basic requirements.62 Looking at the inflation rate from 2003 to 
the present in Iraq, results are volatile, but executed implementation programs 
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prove that it is going better. In the last 5 years, inflation has been a crucial 
problem in terms of economic recession, but current data shows that it is 
improving. For example, in 2003, the inflation rate was 36.3 percent, in 2004, it 
was 31.7 percent, in 2005, it was 31.7, and in 2006, it increased to 53.2.63 
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) data in 2007, “annual 
consumer price inflation peaked at a rate of almost 77 percent in August, fell 
back to around 52 percent in September-November, and increased again to 
almost 65 percent in December. The underlying rate of inflation (excluding fuel 
and transportation) has been stable, in the range of 30–35 percent.”64  
Monetary policies play a vast role in terms of maintaining stabilized and 
low-rate inflation. The IMF has executed a very tight policy against inflation, so 
“the exchange rate of the Iraqi dinar was pegged to the U.S. dollar through most 
of the year, at a rate close to ID 1,477 per U.S. dollar. From mid-November this 
policy has been adjusted to permit a gradual appreciation of the dinar; the daily 
auction-rate declined to ID 1,325 per U.S. dollar at end-December and reached 
ID 1,290 per U.S. dollar by end-January.”65 On top of this, government 
expenditure programs have been controlled and have increased the durability of 
the Iraqi dinar.66 Looking at the 2008 session, implemented policies look 
successful where confidence in security issues has increased domestic 
expenditures and caused a reduction in the inflation rate.67  
The effect of confidence has had a positive impact in gaining control of 
inflation. According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq’s Reconstruction 
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(SIGIR) report, “on June 22, 2008, the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) announced a 
one point reduction in the interest rate it pays on commercial bank deposits—
signaling confidence that underlying inflation is under control.”68 The Following 
figure epitomizes the rates since January 2005. 
 
Figure 1.   Iraqi Dinar / U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate and Overall Inflation Rate69 
 
F. THREE NEGLECTED PROBLEMATIC ISSUES 
Economic issues are very volatile in Iraq. However, there are three 
dynamics that impede economic development strategies and expectations, and 
should be handled together in this vein. Those dynamics are “the growth and 
dynamics of the shadow or informal economy, deterioration in social capital, and 
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the evolving relationship between tribes, gangs and the insurgency”.70 Since the 
invasion in March 2003, these problems are maintaining their prevalence and 
increasing domestic turmoil. Therefore, these dynamics should be scrutinized 
carefully and in a reciprocal manner. 
1. The Informal Economy 
The economic sector of Iraq has witnessed a volatile atmosphere for many 
decades. Within the impact of the sanctions around the 1990s, and the 
consequences of the invasion in 2003, the economic sector of Iraq has been 
damaged, which needs crucial implementations in terms of prosperity. One of the 
important but neglected issues by decision makers in this vein is Iraq’s growing 
informal economy. Proliferated by the devastating consequences of the invasion, 
the informal economy of Iraq has increased dramatically. However, it is not fair to 
imply that the informal economy occurred suddenly after the invasion.  
Looking at the pre-invasion period, the economy of Iraq had relied on 
mostly oil revenue, although Iraq is also known as an agricultural country. 
Nevertheless, the economic policy of the Ba’ath regime chose to exploit mostly 
the oil sector, which diminished the other sectors, such as agriculture and 
industry. When the sanctions were implemented throughout the 1990s, the 
governmental sector was severely damaged, thus it paved the way for the private 
sector to increase its employment sector until the time of invasion in 2003.71 
Therefore, many people worked in the private sector, but many jobs were related 
to the informal economy. Because the central authority collapsed, and control of 
economic data was almost impossible, people were just looking for income to 
stay alive. Thus, uncontrolled trade increased dramatically.  
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In Iraq, the incomes from the informal economy can be divided into two 
categories: “legitimate and illegitimate income opportunities.”72 Because many 
households cannot earn enough money for living, they look for different 
alternatives. Legitimate income opportunities include, “flea markets, street selling 
of small quantity goods, small scale food production, transport, and repair and 
recovery services.”73 On the other side, there is an illegal choice of the informal 
sector. Illegitimate income opportunities include, “smuggling, corruption, 
kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and larceny.”74 Each of them is possible to 
witness in Iraq. Because the control of security and rules of law were severely 
damaged after the invasion, illicit income choices have become attractive for 
jobless people. Broadly, there is a controversial situation in Iraq today. The 
informal economy seems an easy way for increasing income for citizens where 
formal sectors have weakened because of the conflict. 
In general, being dependent on oil revenue weakened the agriculture 
sector in Iraq because of the growth of the oil sector; this situation diminished the 
rate of exports in the agriculture sector.75 That hindrance of developments in the 
other job sectors disappointed domestic producers, and possibly impeded the 
improvement of the formal sector. Not only the level of prosperity in the economy, 
but also the volatile environment affected the size of the informal economy in 
Iraq. It was argued that, “security concerns continue to stifle private investment, 
both domestic and foreign, and prevent market mechanisms from playing their 
anticipated role.”76 Thus, the, unsafe environment has diminished possible job 
creation opportunities. When a government executes unsuccessful policies such 
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as high tax rates, uncontrolled management, and ignorance of the unemployment 
rate, those factors also cause the expansion of the informal economy. It was 
argued that, “…high taxes and a large but restricted (often by unionization or 
party membership) bureaucracy have tended to be associated with substantial 
informal sectors, with the latter acting, in part, as an employment ladder to the 
public sector.”77 
Another crucial factor affecting the size of the informal economy is a 
country’s tendency toward openness to the world markets. This transparent trade 
policy tries to impede the economic deformity that government can cause, and 
reduce the tendency of domestic entrepreneurs to have an interest in the 
informal economy.78 It was pointed out that, 
…the relative size of a country’s informal economy (as a share of 
Gross National Product (GNP)) is related to its progress in opening 
up to the world economy. Those countries that are relatively closed 
and inward oriented (like Iraq around the year 2000) tend to have 
large informal economies, while those countries open to the 
pressures of globalization have much smaller informal economies. 
Furthermore, the informal sector becomes significantly smaller as 
countries increase their control over corruption.79  
As it is apparent that Iraq is in this group of countries, since the Saddam Hussein 
governance did not handle the economy with an outward orientation, instead it 
stayed mostly domestic, and an inward-oriented economy prevailed. 
There are several factors affecting the size of the informal economy in 
Iraq. Especially, after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein, uncertainty, rapid 
increase in crimes, and disability of controlling the corruption have all increased 
the informal sector.80 One of those factors is Iraq’s uncertain demographic 
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shape.81 Actually, it is very difficult to make an accurate estimate of the Iraqi 
population, which plays a vital role in the informal economy. In addition, the 
growth rate of the population is not certain. The IMF’s assessment in 2004 was 
2.7 percent per year.82 Compared with the developing countries, this rate seems 
high. Therefore, this high rate has created distortion in social life, and within the 
low income rates, people have looked for different job opportunities, which 
increased the size of the informal economy. It was argued that, “slow job creation 
in the public sector, and the inability of the formal private sector to absorb all 
surplus labor, combined with rapid population growth, produce a pool of workers 
who can find employment only in the country’s expanding informal economy.”83 
Another important factor in this vein is the high rate of unemployed youth. 
The sanctions and post-conflict uncertainties created a great fall in economic 
income, thus severely damaged job opportunities paved the way for increasing 
the size of the informal economy.  
 Another dimension of the informal economy is institutional limitations and 
difficulties in transitional patterns.84 There are several factors in this vein85:  
1- Looking at the regime in Iraq, political liberalization has caused an 
increase in the informal economy, 
2- After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, free trade began to 
expand into daily life, and people’s demands increased; this 
factor then increased the selling of imported products on the 
streets, which again expanded the size of the informal economy,  
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3- The lack of developments in the rule of law in Iraq is also another 
issue regarding this problem,  
4- Another factor is the proliferation of inflation, which caused an 
increase in the size of informal economy in some parts of Iraq. 
It is apparent that there are many dimensions affecting the size of the 
informal economy. However, the most important factor is the lack of control of 
corruption by the Iraqi government.  
After the invasion, the lack of central authority also caused an increase of 
corruption in Iraq. This uncontrolled environment has paved the way for 
increasing the informal economy. Parallel to this, it was noted that, “The most 
critical factor affecting the size of the informal economy is no doubt the inability of 
the Iraqi government to control corruption. In addition, given the insurgency and 
uncertainty surrounding political developments, it is safe to say that large 
segments of the population have reverted to survival relationships.”86 In addition, 
an insecure environment has affected the benefits of oil production because of 
the violence. “According to the January 2007, Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction (SIGIR) report, Iraq’s petroleum sector faces technical challenges 
in procuring, transporting and storing crude and refined products, as well as 
managing pricing controls and imports, fighting smuggling and corruption, 
improving budget execution, and managing sustainability of operations.”87 
However, it is difficult to accept that U.S decision makers have given great 
attention to this issue in terms of economic development plans. It was argued 
that, “While planning the reconstruction, US authorities did not conduct a survey 
of the country’s capabilities and needs, and did not develop a strategically 
integrated national development plan for Iraq. It did not realistically plan to deal 
with the challenges posed by a state-run economy and corruption, what 
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effectively had become a command kleptocracy.”88 This clarifies that corruption 
is an important issue to be held at a strategic level, because the solution in this 
debate depends on long-term plans and other crucial factors such as security 
and legitimacy. 
2. Deterioration in Social Capital 
One of the crucial factors affecting a country’s social and economic 
situation is its quality of social capital. This phenomenon can be assumed in a 
kind of unwritten and intangible sense, which combines socio-politic relations 
within mutual support. According to the World Bank publications, “social capital 
refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and 
quantity of a society's social interactions. Increasing evidence shows that social 
cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to 
be sustainable.”89 In a broader context, social capital looks like a key element for 
many issues in terms of social, economic and political development. Thus, it is 
likely that this element gathers the ideas, demands, needs and capital of a 
country’s citizens in a reciprocal manner, which refers to social interdependency.  
In the economic dimension, social capital reveals itself as a prominent 
factor especially in transitioning countries. It was argued that social capital is 
assumed to be a social behavior based on trustworthiness, that relations among 
citizens of a country can pave the way for flourishing both economic and non-
economic achievements in every facet of life.90 Thus, strong social capital in a 
country results in a prosperous economy and highly motivated integrity. Social 
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capital and trust can expedite the process of financial negotiations by serving 
better information, mutual coordination, and reciprocal profits, which strengthen 
social ties.91 In scrutinizing this phenomenon in the Iraqi case, deteriorated 
socio-political ties and a skeptical milieu in the economic field, defined how social 
capital has been diminished and ignored by the coalition decision makers to a 
certain extent. Exemplifying this situation, it was argued that, “increased social 
capital has been linked to everything from a vibrant civil society, economic 
efficiency, reduced crime and poverty rates, higher educational achievement and 
better health.”92 The fact that lies beneath the power of social capital is no doubt 
trust. However, the lack of trust in Iraq has exacerbated not only the economic 
development level, but it has escalated tension among different tribes, which in 
turn has revealed a proliferation of criminal activities and the informal sectors in 
the Iraqi economy. The lack of trust in any facet of life in Iraq created a vague 
atmosphere, and relations have weakened where corruption has prevailed in the 
central governance.  
Actually, the prevalence of tribes in social life became dominant before the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. When the sanctions began around the 1990s, the 
authority of the central government diminished; thus the Ba’ath regime decided to 
execute a survival policy that used tribes for local authority and supportive 
units.93 When Saddam Hussein came in power, he used tribes for his ideology 
and political intentions. It was noted that, “under Saddam’s dictatorship, many of 
Iraq’s Sunni tribes enjoyed considerable perquisites and privileges that ensured 
at least some degree of loyalty to the regime. Many tribal shaykhs received 
payments, access to weaponry, and a blind eye from Baghdad to smuggling and 
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other illegal activities.”94 It is apparent that this policy regarding the weak central 
authority shifted the roles of the tribes from local governance alone to illicit 
activities. In the same vein, it was argued that, “Saddam Hussein delegated more 
power and autonomy to tribes after the Gulf War in 1991 when he lost control of 
large sections of the country for them to supervise in exchange for more 
autonomy over tribal affairs.”95 Thus, social deterioration has been witnessed 
because of incompetent security measures. Ignorant policies of the Ba’ath 
regime paved the way for criminal activities such as “looting, smuggling, and 
hijacking,”96 and social relations became polarized in a hesitating manner.  
These incorrect policies regarding the Iraqi population have shaped local 
networks far away from a strong social capital system. The lack of central 
authority combined with the poor policies of the coalition forces regarding the 
nation-state system, have increased the uncertainty of relations in the future, and 
caused a dramatic decrease in trust. It was noted that, “many discussions of the 
benefits of social capital frequently present increased economic efficiency and 
savings in health, education and law enforcement as the strongest argument for 
trusting one another.”97 
The necessity of trust in social capital proves its importance where social 
and economic ties are damaged in a country. Since trust specifies the 
competence of social capital in many fields, the lack of trust cannot build a 
successful social capital chain. Thus, the quality of social capital can be used as 
a guide for recognizing the affordability and flexibility of a country’s current 
economic and social ties. Long-term plans and strategies can be improved 
according to those relations. However, it is difficult to see required achievements 
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in Iraq regarding social capital. The way that U.S. decision makers have followed 
in this regard could not achieve tangible results where the consequences of the 
invasion increased social distrust and economic recession. Many studies in this 
vein epitomize that, and although foreign institutions have tried to strengthen 
social capital, they have a caused recession in social capital.98 According to 
Joseph Kosper, who is a U.S. major in Iraq and focused on social capital issues 
criticized that, both the legacy of Saddam Hussein, in terms of his dichotomized 
policy in social capital, and increased turmoil after the 2003 U.S. invasion, 
diminished the level of trust among the Iraqi citizens.99 He also continued that 
neither the Iraqi nor American decision makers’ impatient behaviors matched the 
basics of social capital logic, where Iraqi citizens are given important positions 
not only at the decision-making level, but must also be the ones to carry them 
out, even though such assignments may take longer to complete.100  
As noted above, trust is such a crucial factor for the prosperity of 
economic conditions where it supports mutual motivation regarding easy access 
for exchanging the productions or services in a reciprocal manner.101 Thus, trust 
seems a likely advantage for social connection as it consolidates relationships 
and gives required notions for financial transactions in every facet of the 
economy.  
Martin Raiser explains that in an economic transaction, there are three 
different relationships among the groups and these three cause the emergence 
of three different types of trust. The first one is related to family relations that 
refer to economic activities in existing economies and exemplify the main theme 
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of house economy, and it is called an ‘ascribed trust’.102 The second one refers 
to a kind of relationship called a ‘process-based trust’; that people in this 
relationship have known each other for many years. Many business networks are 
described as having this kind of long-term relationship.103 The third one refers to 
a kind relationship between individuals, who have little knowledge about the 
other side’s typical features in economic transactions, called ‘extended trust,’104 
Among these three different types of trust, the last one has great importance, 
since economic transactions occur between large numbers of unrelated 
individuals and are a key factor for a contemporary economic system. 
Focusing again on the Iraqi case, it is apparent that many Iraqi business 
networks are related to ascribed trust and those networks are restricted to the 
informal economy and surrounded by tribes, family relations and the same ethnic 
identities that work mostly with an unwritten agreement.105 The functions of 
ascribed trust are very important to Iraqi citizens as they benefit mostly from the 
informal economy for their household income. Because formal sectors have been 
destroyed and because there is suffering due to uncontrolled corruption and lack 
of security, people trust the informal sectors to be the best choice for their 
income in the short term. 
On the other hand, process-based trust plays an exacerbating role in 
terms of economic development in Iraq. Since this kind of trust includes long-
term relationships between individuals, ties between former Ba’ath government 
members and the criminal groups that flourished during the sanctioned period of 
the 1990s, resemble the existence of this kind of trust.106 Today, the insurgency 
and criminal gangs, and ties among those illicit activities characterize the 
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existence of process-based trust in Iraq. Therefore, long-terms relations and the 
lack of a strong central control have paved the way for the process-based 
networks where the insurgency has been inflamed violently. The negative effects 
of process-based networks in the economic field can be explained in a few 
words:107  
Damaged formal economy and proliferation of the informal sectors within 
the impact of vague borders among illicit activities, formal, and informal sectors; 
blackmailing, kidnapping, looting, extortion and severe violence against 
innocent citizens to exploit  their fear; 
the legal or illegal utilization of trade in profitable natural resources; 
increased decentralization in the financial and productive fields. 
The last mentioned extended trust does not have the dominance it needs 
in the Iraqi economy. Although extended trust networks play a crucial role in 
contemporary economic systems, the dominance of the informal economy in Iraq 
does not bode well for the prospect of modern economic ties. There is no doubt 
that extended trust is a key factor for the Iraqi economy where plausible solutions 
can be executed within this kind of economic relations; however, the lack of 
financial support has limited modern economic occurrences, and intrusion of the 
informal sectors into the labor market dominate the ascribed-trust networks.108 
Without crucial implementations in the economic field, social capital will continue 
deteriorating due to the lack of modern economic tying systems. 
3. The Insurgency and Criminal Gangs 
After the invasion in 2003, violence and turmoil increased in a devastating 
manner. Weak central authority and tribal loyalties exacerbated the level of 
violence. For the same reason, criminal activities have been a big obstacle, not 
only for building a new secular and democratic country, but also for 
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improvements in the economic field.109 Therefore, the insurgency and criminal 
gangs have plunged the Iraqi domestic market into recession and exacerbated 
the poor Iraqi economy. Parallel to this, it was noted that, “street crime has been 
a serious problem since the war ended. In the late summer of 2003, a World 
Bank assessment team reported that crime was among the top four obstacles to 
private-sector investment, along with poor access to finance, telecommunication 
problems and macroeconomic instability.”110 In fact, there is a great connection 
among the informal economy, the insurgency and corruption. If a secure 
environment cannot be maintained, it is almost impossible to create job 
opportunities, which in turn will affect the economic improvement in the long run.  
In the same vein, it was noted that there is a great relation between 
“…unemployment, poverty, deterioration of living standards, violence, and 
terrorist attacks.”111 In this volatile environment, it is crucial to build and maintain 
a secure milieu, which can pave the way for further economic development 
programs. It was argued that rebuilding law and order would be an essential way 
to hinder violence and crime, which in turn will create a feeling of security in the 
workforce, and increase productivity.112 On the other hand, it is a disappointing 
reality that insurgent groups have opportunities to conduct their attacks. It has 
been argued that, “…the insurgents often have excellent intelligence from 
sources within the Iraqi government, Iraqi forces, the Iraqis supporting Coalition 
forces and government activities, and Iraqi industry. This enables them to locate 
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soft targets, hit at key points in terms of Iraq’s economy and aid projects, and 
time their attacks to points of exceptional vulnerability.”113  
The insurgency is also a virulent action in terms of damaging the main 
income resource in Iraq, namely oil. Because of the lack of security and control 
over illegal groups, the economy has been affected in a frustrating manner. As it 
was reported, “damage to pipelines, fires, poor maintenance, and attacks have 
combined to slow production of refined products and crude oil for export, 
primarily in central and northern Iraq. Production and exports in the south remain 
the primary driving force of Iraq’s economy, although aging infrastructure and 
maintenance problems impede near-term increases in production and 
exports.”114  
Robert Looney defined the important elements of the insurgency and 
criminal gangs in a collaborative manner. This model, named the Third 
Generation (3G2) Gang Model, exemplifies many different causes of criminal 
issues and illegal activities. In this model, parallel to the problems mentioned 
above, it was explained that because of a state’s underdeveloped economic 
level, violence and crime networks cannot be impeded by this state where the 
economy cannot support security precautions.115 That environment is now what 
is prominent in Iraq, and the lack of central authority does not seem to be able to 
cope with the insurgency and criminal gangs. In Iraq, the insurgency increased, 
especially after the collapse of the previous regime, and the main influence 
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shifted “from street to sub-national level.”116 Corruption and inadequate state 
security policies caused an expansion of the gangs.117  
This model separates criminal gang actions into three generations. The 
first generation includes classical street groups, which do not act as a major 
threat; their shape is far from an agile structure and they commit only occasional 
crimes.118 The second generation includes major threat activities that have a 
relation with the insurgency; their structure is more seasoned and their financial 
supports come from the informal economy activities, such as ransom, illicit oil 
export and drugs.119 The last generation is a major problem for a state’s security 
and regime. This third generation criminal group’s shape is highly seasoned and 
full of political goals.120 They consist of government officials, who shifted to the 
illicit activities, and behave as a real government where they have the ability to 
serve the public.121 So, criminal networks are revealed as a main impediment to 
security and the formal economy. Insurgents and criminal gangs have impeded 
not only security and social life, but also economic developments.  
When criminal activities become dominant, it also affects the formal 
sectors of the economy.122 This in turn, caused the jobless youth to choose to 
join criminal gangs that offer financial support with stealing and looting in Iraq.123 
Unfortunately, because of the proliferation of criminal activities and the 
insurgency, political and economic foundations were damaged, especially after 
the invasion in 2003. For example, “the prestigious Transparency International 
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Corporation ranks Iraq as the most corrupt country in the Middle East. The 
country’s current ranking is 129th out of 145 nations worldwide, with the country’s 
corruption actually worsening between 2003 and 2004.”124 
Because of instability, the lack of control over corruption, and the high rate 
of unemployment, violence and crime rates have increased in Iraq, especially 
after the overthrow of the Saddam regime. In this dangerous environment, police 
forces have not been able to cope with the turmoil created by insurgents and 
criminal gangs, and the worse thing is the unacceptable intentions of staff 
officials that join the government in order to steal the state’s income.125 This 
situation seems to be a catastrophic failure at the state level, where many 
implementation programs try to recover the damaged economy.  
Since the oil is the most important income source in Iraq, it is plausible to 
expect some informal activities in terms of oil revenue. Because of the poverty 
and economic crisis, some dishonest officials make deals with criminal groups to 
purchase the oil at the official price level, and then to sell at higher prices on the 
black market.126 Fortunately, government has taken some important precautions 
in this field, and “…has begun to clamp down on those officials and gas station 
owners who are allowing the gasoline to leak into the black market.”127 However, 
those precautions do not seem to be enough to cope with the current illicit oil 
trade. Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, uncontrollable locations of this territory 
have increased dramatically. Thus, insurgents and criminal gangs have figured 
out a way to control many of the distribution points in Iraq, and exploited the 
differences between the official, subsidized market prices and much higher prices 
by exporting illicitly out of Iraq.128 This is a typical way for insurgents to find 
                                            
124 Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: The Expansion of Iraq’s Shadow Economy,” 2. 
125 Ibid. 




financial support. More broadly, that situation not only increases their income, but 
also instigates the opposite groups against the invasion of Iraq. As a numeric 
result, it was noted that, “CPA officials estimated in early 2004 that smugglers 
were able to steal up to $200,000 worth of oil every day.”129 
There is a reciprocal linkage between insurgents and criminal gangs. 
Criminals generally work with insurgents, and they conduct their political will by 
kidnapping people, which reveals a “street-level hostage economy.”130 When 
insurgents kidnap people, they give them to criminal gangs for money, and gangs 
sell them back to the insurgent groups when the situation becomes available.131 
A worrisome consequence of criminal activities is that insurgents target highly 
educated citizens. This in turn, affects the development of the economy in a 
devastating manner. When insurgents kidnap the scholars, doctors, and 
businesspersons, this turmoil results in an abandonment of the country by the 
others where the formal economy is so terribly damaged.132 Again, living with 
fear and suspicion erodes the possible grounds for the formal sectors, and the 
informal economy remains alive by these illicit activities. 
Related to the security issue, in July 2008, the Congressional Research 
Service report pointed out the importance of security, that exemplified the 
devastating results of insurgent activities in this manner. It was explained that, 
rebuilding projects and current infrastructures have been demolished by the 
attacks of insurgents.133 For example, 
…in June 2007, eight of the twelve 400-kV transmission lines were 
out of service, greatly reducing the electricity supply to Baghdad. 
Major pipelines continue to be sabotaged, shutting down oil 
exports. Along with criminal activity and poor equipment, insurgent 
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attacks are estimated to be responsible for the loss of $16 billion in 
oil revenue during a two year period from 2005-2006.134  
Thus, it is apparent that spending money on reconstruction projects has become 
futile, and rebuilding costs have increased dramatically because of the lack of 
security and required precautions. For example, “a 2006 SIGIR survey of major 
U.S. contractors found security costs to range from a low of 7.6% to a high of 
16.7%. Unanticipated security costs as well as the related need to shift $1.8 
billion from water and power projects to the training and equipping of Iraqi forces 
has meant that infrastructure programs could accomplish less than originally 
anticipated.”135 
In the same vein, money spent by coalition forces could not be fruitful 
regarding security and reconstruction efforts, and many expenditures have been 
wasted. In his occasional paper, Joseph J. Collins criticized the current situation 
and pointed out that, although many millions have been spent, oil and electricity 
production is not at the expected level, and capacity is limited in order to execute 
the rebuilding processes.136 The main causes lie under the lack of security and 
instability. Moreover, the effects of corruption and incompetence have weakened 
the economic situation so that stabilization efforts have not done well in terms of 
economic development. It was noted that, “according to a 2007 U.S. Government 
report, after the United States spent nearly $6 billion and completed nearly 3,000 
reconstruction projects, the new government of Iraq has agreed to take 
possession of just 435 of them, worth only half a billion dollars. The rest remain 
idle or have been turned over to weak local governments.” 137 It reveals that 
economic developments play a vast role in every facet of life, especially where  
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turmoil and criminal activities prevail. Since these weak governments remain for 
some time, impeding local crimes and the insurgency have become extremely 
difficult.  
Criticizing the policies executed in Iraq, some errors reveal themselves to 
be a problem with security issues, which Washington explained as deficiencies. 
They are: the Incompetence of the military to stop plundering and violence 
encouraged the insurgents and criminal gangs; the lack of security forces to 
maintain stability in Iraq paved the way for criminal groups and their purposes; 
and troublesome financing and agreement systems, which diminished the 
rebuilding and development projects, have become a benefit for insurgents.138 
More to the point, these problems have caused a brain drain, and many people 
with average incomes have disappeared.139 This situation affected the social life 
in Iraq negatively, and the morality of the citizens was destroyed because of the 
incompetence of security forces on the ongoing illicit occurrences by insurgents. 
Furthermore, although it has been four years since the insurgency, it was stated 
that, “…the United States still does not have the ground troops in its base force 
to support the kind of troop rotations and in-country force levels necessary to 
create an appropriate level of security that, in turn, could help to move us in the 
direction of political success in the insurgency.”140 
A survey by the Brookings Institution epitomizes the current situation in 
Iraq regarding security and stability among developing countries. The following 
table shows the weakness of the states according to some aspects. Iraq, in this 
vein, exemplifies a low grade in security and political stability because of the 
existing insurgency, and uncontrolled territory by central governance.141 
Moreover, Iraq is at the fourth level among the worst countries in the economic 
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arena, the lack of rule of law and incompetent security measures, which 
exacerbate human right abuses. Merging these three factors, the insurgency 
plays a provocative role in every facet of problematic areas. 
 
Table 2.   Worst Performers by Basket and by Individual Indicator 142 
A recent specific research by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) shows that in four provinces—Baghdad, Salah ad Din, Ninewa, 
and Diyala—the violence remains very high, but overall this is a general 
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catastrophic problem in Iraq.143 Violence occurs because of the lack of security, 




Figure 2.   Average Daily Attacks by Province (July 2007-November 2007)144 
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III. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
In the previous chapter, some of the general problems, and more broadly, 
three neglected issues—the informal economy, deterioration in social capital, and 
the insurgency and criminal gangs—were scrutinized in a comparative manner. 
From the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to date, several solutions have been attempted 
to reach a prosperous economic level in Iraq. However, it is not possible to say 
that all the executed policies regarding economic prosperity have met with good 
results. Since it has been more than five years after the invasion in 2003, 
decision makers had some experiences that can make the current situation 
better in Iraq. In the following chapter, some of the lessons learned will be 
discussed, and then possible strategies for the future will be explained. 
A. LESSONS LEARNED 
Several lessons have been revealed regarding economic poverty in Iraq. 
Because of the volatile demographic shape of Iraq, turmoil within local groups 
caused big obstacles to economic development strategies. For example, 
because of plundering and attacks conducted by insurgents, many of the 
Coalition’s improvement projects failed, which in turn affected the long term 
policies for prosperity.145 When these projects were not accomplished, it created 
a lack of trust and social demoralization in the public eye. It was not only security 
issues, but also some wrong policies that affected the situation in Iraq. The lack 
of prioritization in critical sectors by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
resulted in unsuccessful plans such as ignoring agricultural improvement and 
shifting required funding to electricity reconstruction projects.146 This situation 
caused the agricultural sector to falter, and lots of job opportunities were lost. 
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Many projects were postponed and became futile when complicated acquisition 
processes caused long delays by U.S government.147  
There are more experiences in terms of rebuilding the Iraqi economy, and 
implementing better projects for the future. However, it is important to criticize the 
CPA’s misconceptions on this issue. When a country is invaded by another 
country to fix its social, political, economical and military problems, firstly, the 
planned projects should be executed reciprocally with the indigenous citizens of 
this invaded country. Otherwise, neither side can compromise, and then many 
planned projects can fail. Looking back on the situation in Iraq, in order to 
execute rebuilding projects in a quick time, the CPA usually ignored Iraqi 
decision makers and the voice of indigenous citizens; moreover, those Iraqi 
citizens’ interpretations were not evaluated in the decision-making process.148  
Many efforts could not reach success as expected; time and money were often 
wasted. What's more, the CPA’s expectations for the future were far from 
rational. When a project is planned, the problems should be handled in a realistic 
manner, and different points of view should be gathered for a better evaluation of 
the problems. In this point, the CPA’s quick solution propositions for the problems 
in order to rebuild the country to the prewar level failed, and Iraqi citizens 
witnessed these unsuccessful attempts, which were worrisome for their future.149  
While focusing on the reconstruction projects for a prosperous economy, 
environmental factors such as security should be carefully considered. In order to 
build and maintain a viable economy, a stabilized and secure environment should 
be maintained. Otherwise, the efforts for economic development can and will be 
damaged by the effects of the insurgency and criminal groups, which were 
explained in the previous chapter. When the CPA focused on the economic 
reconstruction projects, it ignored the security issues, which have priority in this 
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realm, and those neglected issues caused a big delay in economic reconstruction 
efforts.150 The main reason for this delay was the increasing crime rates, and the 
lack of trust, which created fear and disturbance in Iraqi citizens’ minds. In this 
respect, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) audit 
reports identified the main results of the incapable security forces in Iraq:  
• Over $104.1 million was spent in an unsuccessful attempt to 
train Iraqi security forces to protect critical infrastructures. 
• The United States had to adjust its priorities and reallocate 
over $1.78 billion in IRRF reconstruction funds to provide for 
security and law enforcement programs. 
• About $560 million was wasted because construction efforts 
were sabotaged and had to be rebuilt and were delayed. 
• Government officials were precluded from performing their 
quality control functions. 
• Provincial Reconstruction Teams were often unable to have 
face-to-face contacts with local officials, a critical objective of 
the program.151 
In order to maintain a prosperous economy, it is crucial to make a 
connection between today’s urgent demands and long-term expectations. 
Without solving the current economic problems, future plans are not likely to 
create a better economy, and many efforts may become futile. In the Iraqi case, 
although the Coalition achieved some economic reconstruction in the short term, 
the CPA could not maintain its continuation in the long run, such as “restoring 
state-owned enterprises, creating sustainable jobs, and promoting private sector 
growth”152, and this caused stagnation and aggravation in the development 
process. 153 
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An effective banking system is one of the main points for a better 
economy. However, to maintaining a secure environment, developments in oil 
revenue, and finding solutions for debt problems have great importance in the 
banking system.154 Because of the insurgency and criminal groups and the 
growing informal economy, which negatively affect the oil sector, there are 
serious impediments to a stable and strong banking system in Iraq. Thus, there 
should be a good linkage between the Coalition and local Iraqi decision makers 
in that sense. However, it does not seem that there is good collaboration in Iraq 
between the CPA and the Iraqi delegates that could lead to a suitable agreement 
for Iraqi citizens.155 This situation affects the social deterioration and well as the 
expectations of the Iraqi people for prosperity. It has been argued that, “Islamic 
banking, one of the most rapidly growing areas of finance in the Middle East, is 
not even mentioned in the voluminous documents and directives released by the 
CPA.”156 Therefore, this gap between the institutions caused uncertainty among 
the local Iraqi citizens in terms of viable reconstruction efforts. The lack of a 
strong and functional banking system affects foreign investors and 
entrepreneurs, and foreign banking companies in a skeptical manner, which in 
turn impedes the privatization and development steps of economic 
reconstruction.  
One misperception made by the CPA was the amount of dependence on 
market forces, especially in an insecure area where turmoil is prevalent.157 
Actually, the CPA was expecting that market reforming and privatization of 
investments would support the rebuilding projects; however, the lack of security, 
and emerging criminal gangs and violence within a vague environment caused 
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diminishing rebuilding efforts.158 This consequence reveals that when a project is 
focused on, the other factors, which may affect this project should be evaluated, 
such as environment, security, social structure, economic level, and local 
people’s views. In this sense, the privatization of investments could be stalled 
until a reliable and stable atmosphere have occurred in Iraq. 
In order to maintain high economic reconstruction efforts, it is crucial to 
decentralize the central government’s power when engendering this 
reconstruction by local Iraqi people.159 Because Iraq is trying to transfer to a 
stable environment from violence and turmoil, it would be plausible to 
decentralize the government to expedite the economic recovery. At this point, it is 
argued that, “…the CPA was unsuccessful in overcoming ministries’ opposition 
securing funding for local authorities and Iraqi citizens to participate directly in the 
reconstruction process.”160 
One of the disappointing experiences regarding the open economy was 
the initiation of a neo-liberal approach by the CPA, which aimed to execute “free 
market reforms”161 in order to increase the level of the economy in Iraq in the 
short term.162 However, the post-conflict environment and uncertainties in Iraq 
did not match the neo-liberal approach. Because of the increasing insurgency 
and escalation among the tribal groups, privatization efforts for investment 
sectors and the recovery of economic initiatives have been impeded.163 There 
are several key reasons why the neo-liberal strategy was not suitable for Iraq: 
• Neo-liberal strategy restricts the bulk of the population from making 
decisions, so this creates a big gap among the institutions; 
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• Although the neo-liberal strategy paves the way for lots of 
opportunities for the private sectors, in the Iraqi case, it does not 
seem likely to create prosperous results because of the prevalence 
of uncertainty in social and economic life, as well as the insurgency;  
• Because of the fragile shape of the Iraqi economy after the conflict, 
a neo-liberal strategy does not fit  this weak economic structure 
when an economic situation goes wrong, so before expected 
market reforms, strong institutions should be built and an affordable 
economic ground should be created; 
• Because a neo-liberal strategy does not allow the central 
government to intervene in the Iraqi economy, this situation creates 
a highly uncertain environment within the increasingly unstable 
markets where the government is unable to handle the troubles and 
economic crises;  
• One of the intentions of the reconstruction efforts was the 
dichotomization of the institutions connected to the previous 
regime, however, neo-liberal policies were incapable of executing 
institutional evolvement projects, so criminal gangs, insurgents and 
religious-based groups filled the resulting gaps; 
• Finally new policies for a neo-liberal strategy paved the way for 
increasing extremism, the recruiting of young Iraqi people, and 
uncertainty; moreover, this uncertainty was engendered by “threats 
of mass privatization and high unemployment rates”164, and the 
government’s lack of response to economic reforms were exploited 
by radical groups.165 
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It should be noted that time and money are crucial keys for the economic 
reconstruction process for any country. In the Iraqi case, it is apparent that funds 
allocated for reconstruction were sometimes wasted because of the inappropriate 
policies of the CPA.166 The CPA has made mistakes regarding controlling 
allocated funds. In the Congress Report for Iraqi Reconstruction Assistance in 
August 2008 some solid examples were given: 
A January 2005 SIGIR audit found that the CPA ‘provided less than 
adequate controls’ for $8.8 billion of DFI resources it moved 
through Iraqi ministries. An April 2005 audit concluded that CPA 
managers of DFI funds distributed in the South-Central region of 
Iraq could not account for more than $96.6 million in cash and 
receipts. An October 2005 audit found that South-Central personnel 
could not account for more than $20.5 million in Rapid Regional 
Response Program funds and made $2.6 million in excessive 
payments. In late 2005, several U.S. citizens were criminally 
charged with respect to the handling of these funds — and have 
since pled guilty. In February 2007, five more were indicted.167  
These frustrating examples reveal that lots of funds created illicit activities, 
and the lack of trust became prevalent in the country. Mismanagement and 
wrong policies in reconstruction programs regarding U.S. funding exacerbated 
the current situation in Iraq, and increased the number of crimes.168  
As noted in the previous chapter, the lack of adequate security in Iraq 
impeded many planned activities in the execution phase. In terms of producing 
reports for the news and having the outcomes of the current situation be in 
different provinces of Iraq, the media and related groups could not achieve what 
they had aimed for.169 Therefore, local security measures in many provinces 
were weak, and mismanagement in security issues that handled the Coalition 
Forces caused those impediments; moreover, those precautions could not 
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alleviate the insurgency and turmoil. This atmosphere precluded successful 
assessments of the SIGIR in many ways. It was noted that, “the SIGIR 
conducted some assessments by aerial imagery because of the risk to its 
personnel; while investigating for its April 2008 report on the Nassriya Water 
Treatment Plant, on-site inspections were limited to 30 minutes each.”170 Parallel 
to this, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigators could not come 
to Iraq when they were it was preparing water and sanitation program reports for 
2005, because of the lack of a stable environment.171  
In the August 2008 Congress Report, criticisms of the Iraqi Reconstruction 
were noted for the years between 2003 and 2006. In security issues, the main 
lesson learned was the CPA’s failure to figure out the main requirements of a 
secure environment, and its hasty decision to eliminate the Iraqi military forces at 
an inappropriate time.172 As noted in the previous chapter, those wrong decisions 
could not have alleviated the increasing violence, and many of the Iraqi military 
members shifted to the illicit activities, which in turn proliferated the rate of the 
insurgency, and created uncertainty regarding the social trust. Moreover, the 
unemployment rate became high and people looked for alternative income 
sources, which increased the informal economy within five years. In addition, the 
lack of adequate security measures undermined many beneficial projects in the 
execution phase, increased the required funds because of long delays in those 
projects, which caused a shift of the allocated money from other projects, and 
damaged foreign investment with the indigenous participation that would have 
resulted in projects that are more successful.173 
                                            
170 Tarnoff, “CRS Report for Congress Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance,” August 2008, 34. 
171 Ibid., 35. 
172 Curt Tarnoff, “CRS Report for Congress Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance,” May 2008. 
173 Ibid.
 53
The current rebuilding strategy has focused on “market reforms, 
infrastructure development and private foreign investment,”174 instead of creating 
trust among the institutions, which would accelerate the downfall of social capital 
in Iraq. Thus, many funds for inappropriate investments have been squandered 
because they were easy targets for insurgents and criminal gangs.175 In addition, 
the post-war strategy has not given satisfactory participation to the indigenous 
Iraqi people regarding building trust and improving social relations among the 
foreign and domestic markets.176 Thus, the economic development process did 
not have the expected result and the local people are concerned about whether 
or not their future will be better. Without engendering social trust among the 
institutions, and building connections between foreign and local institutions, 
crucial changes in an economic realm cannot be obtained.  
Finally, the economic development process has been greatly affected by 
increasing the informal economy in Iraq. As noted in the previous chapter, the 
main cause of the informal economy is uncontrolled corruption. Oil revenues 
have played a vast role in this sense, because people of different regions do not 
trust each other for a fair allocation of income from oil.177 A good lesson from this 
is that a direct and fair distribution of oil revenues could diminish this problem 
regarding rebuilding trust networks among the different ethnic groups. However, 
the lack of control over the distribution of oil revenues and other economic 
activities have paved the way for the increasing informal economy in Iraq. 
Because the local people were skeptical about the prospect of their country in 
terms of their economic and social lives, they thought that the informal economy 
would be a good remedy for their future. In addition, uncontrolled corruption  
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supported the informal economy where local security management could not be 
established by the Coalition Forces and the Iraqi Military personnel in a 
reciprocal manner. 
B. STRATEGIES AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Coalition forces decided to 
implement economic reforms regarding reconstruction principles. However, it 
was difficult to execute those remedies where the environment was vague and 
uncertainty has been prevailing in every facet of economic structure. When May 
2003 came, it was the end of active combat operations in Iraq, and the tangible 
economic reconstruction efforts began to be initiated by the U.S. Congress.178 In 
this regard, the following funds were established in order to execute strategies at 
the local level and create a prosperous economy. But, Microfinance Institutions 
(MFI), The Commanders Emergency Response Programs (CERP), and The 
Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) played a vast role regarding the 
aforementioned three neglected issues—the informal economy, the insurgency, 
and damage in social capital—in all those funds. The following table epitomizes a 
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Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund  IRRF  $20.86
Iraq Security Force Fund  ISFF  $17.94
Economic Support Fund  ESF  $ 3.74
Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program  
CERP  $ 3.49
Other Funding  $ 4.43
Total  $50.46
Table 3.   Appropriated Funds179 
 
1. Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) 
For the initial reconstruction, the U.S Congress allocated $3.34 billion,180 
and $2.47 billion of this amount released under Public Law 108-11 “for necessary 
expenses for humanitarian assistance in and around Iraq and to carry out the 
purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for rehabilitation and 
reconstruction in Iraq,”181 which was defined as the Iraq Relief and 
Reconstruction Fund (IRFF).182 The purpose of this fund was to assist the 
planners of the Coalition Forces and the local Iraqi governance for upcoming 
“humanitarian crisis in the aftermath of the Operation of Iraqi Freedom.”183 In 
order to get better results, $18.439 billion were allocated for the same purposes 
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under the same public law (108-11), which is defined as IRRF2.184 Those funds 
include both construction projects, such as “security and law enforcement, 
justice, electricity, oil infrastructure, water resources and sanitation, 
transportation and telecommunication, roads, bridges and construction, 
healthcare, private sector development, education, democracy,185 and on the 
other hand, include requirements such as “…equipment, supplies and 
training.”186 
2. Iraq Security Force Fund 
This fund was built in May 2005 in order to give permission to the Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq to supply financial support for 
improving Iraqi security forces’ development.187 As shown in Table III, according 
to the SIGIR July 2008 report, $17.94 billion were allocated to increase the level 
of Iraqi security forces. These forces included the Iraqi Army, Navy, and Air 
Force under the Ministry of Defense, and the Iraqi Police, the National Police, 
and the Border Enforcement under the Ministry of Interior.188 Maybe not directly, 
but this fund can play an alternative role regarding the precautions for the 
insurgency and criminal gangs when Iraqi security forces become centralized 
and well trained. 
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3. Economic Support Fund 
Actually, after the elections in 2005, the resentments among the 
institutions in Iraq were not alleviated because of their renewed positions in 
governmental structure.189 Under the Foreign Assistance Act, the Economic 
Support Fund (ESF) was established.190 This fund is required to strengthen the 
security level of Iraq and assist in Iraq’s transition process to become a viable 
country.191 The ESF program executes some “governance reforms at the local, 
provincial, and national-levels of government and strengthening Iraq’s private 
sector economy.”192 In addition, this program focuses on maintaining stabilization 
among the important cities of Iraq regarding the prosperity of economy and 
engendering job opportunities.193Thus, relating to the problems in the previous 
chapter, this fund can be a beneficial remedy to diminish the informal economy 
and the insurgency. As shown in Table III, $3.74 billion was allocated for this 
program. Especially in the strategic cities of Iraq, within this appropriation, local 
stability can expedite the improvement process and the insurgents and criminal 
gangs can be weakened. 
4. Microfinance Institutions 
One of the crucial institutions playing a vast role in the economic 
development of Iraq is the establishment of Microfinance Institutions (MFI). 
Combined with the legacy of Saddam Hussein, the aftermath of the 2003 
invasion in Iraq, the necessity of these foundations to support small enterprises 
became apparent. Began in 2003, the foundation of microfinance institutions 
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have successfully supplied leverage in terms of economic development.194 
Moreover, this support by microfinance institutions has been a remedy for 
impeding the proliferation of recruits for the insurgency and criminal gangs. 
Because the lack of job opportunities is a critical factor for young and discontent 
individuals to join those illegal groups, microfinance institutions increased this 
opportunity. Microfinance has been financially assisted and enlarged by the U.S. 
State Department within the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, the United 
States Agency for International Department (USAID), and by the US/Multinational 
military.195 It is difficult to create job opportunities where uncertainty, insecure 
environment and poverty are prevailing. Therefore, microfinance institutions can 
be seen as a kind of solution for short, medium, and maybe long term, to support 
the enhancement of the formal sector, and alleviate the lack of entrepreneurships 
and level of poverty.196 
There are six MFIs in Iraq, which has thirty-one offices in sixteen 
provinces; three of those MFIs are international Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGO) MFIs, and the rest of them are indigenous NGO MFIs197. 
Two of those International NGO MFIs have been granted by USAID under the 
Community Action Program (CAP), one International NGO MFI, and three 
Indigenous NGO MFIs have been founded by the “IZDIHAR Project,”198 and 
USAID.199  
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As a quick view, since the establishment of MFIs, 52,768 loans have been 
disbursed, at a value of $109,471.162.200 The number of outstanding loans is 
19,019, and by value, it is $26,765.351 in July 2007.201 Actually, it is expected 
that MFIs support more small enterprises in the long run. Since these institutions 
supply a small amount of loans to small businesses, opportunity for people 
increases regarding building small-scale enterprises.202 Thus, it can be easy to 
become widespread for MFIs via those opportunities among the Iraqi provinces, 
and increasing job opportunities even on a small-scale can reduce poverty, which 
in turn, decreases the informal economy and corruption. Many Iraqi citizens have 
been suffering from unemployment for more than five years. Moreover, the lack 
of an essential banking system, a viable economic regulation system, and the 
foreign investment directed U.S. decision-makers to create alternative job 
sectors. In this sense, MFIs seem to be a plausible remedy for this volatile 
environment where corruption is still a problem due to the lack of adequate 
security measures, and the informal economy, which contains a huge amount of 
the Iraqi economy. 
The following table exemplifies the current status of MFIs since 2003: 
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Table 4.   MFI Offices by Province203 
 
5. The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) 
The Commander’s Emergency Response Program was founded in May 
2003, “to respond to urgent humanitarian, relief and reconstruction requirements 
within the commander’s area of responsibility by executing programs that 
immediately assist indigenous population.”204 To support local development, and 
maintain a stable environment, this kind of program would be appropriate at the 
local level in Iraq. The aftermath of the invasion in 2003 made it necessary to 
implement some projects that can handle the environmental problems. In its 
initial phase, the funding for CERP created by the Coalitional Provision Authority 
(CPA), “using seized Iraqi assets and oil revenue from the Development Fund for 
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Iraq (DFI),”205 and then from late 2003 to date, totaling $3.5 billion in allocation 
funds appropriated by the United States.206 Actually, those allocations are 
assumed to be a kind of alleviation of the current frustrating atmosphere in Iraq, 
for not only supplying urgent needs, but also for handling the corrupted areas 
and repairing damaged standards of living. More broadly, this program gave 
opportunity to U.S. military commanders to convince local Iraqi citizens of a 
prosperous economy, and to create a stable environment within the 
reconstruction projects.207 
Looking at the last data from SIGIR July 2008 presented to Congress, 
CERP was allocated $800 million under the Supplemental Appropriation Act.208 
In addition to the aforementioned humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts 
since 2003, CERP supplies various job opportunities to the local Iraqi citizens, 
and the funds allocated for CERP projects are controlled by Multi-National Corps-
Iraq (MNC-I) and executed at the Multi-National Division level.209 Since its 
establishment, numerous regulations have been applied. For example, In July 
2008, the Government of Iraq (GOI) focused on a new CERP program, namely I-
CERP, allocating Iraqi funds, with the cooperation of CERP managers from the 
U.S., for the implementation of immediate reconstruction projects regarding 
ameliorating the social level of Iraqi citizens.210 
The following table epitomizes the appropriated, obligated and expended 
amounts of CERP projects to date. Therefore, $2.88 billion was allocated of the 
appropriated $3.49 billion, and $2.40 billion was expended to date. 
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Table 5.   U.S. Support for Iraqi Reconstruction ($ billions)211 
 
When these projects are chosen, it requires diligent adherence to focus on 
necessity and importance, because the immediate reactions at the local level 
play a vast role regarding the future reconstruction efforts. Therefore, the 
specifications for the chosen projects mandate that they are accomplished in a 
limited time, that local Iraqi citizens can find a job, that local Iraqi citizens will 
profit, and that they are impressive enough to win the hearts of the Iraqi 
people.212 More broadly, there is a big range of CERP projects that serve many 
diverse areas of the reconstruction efforts including, “Water and sanitation, Food 
production and distribution, Agriculture, Electricity, Heathcare, Education, 
Telecommunications, Economic, financial, and management improvements, 
Transportation, Rule of law and governance, Irrigation, Civic cleanup activities, 
Civic support vehicles, Repair of civic and cultural facilities, Repair of damage, 
Condolence payments, Payment to individuals upon release from detention, 
Protective measures, Other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction projects, and 
Micro-Grants.” 213  
It is clear that CERP projects handle many different reconstruction 
purposes. Focusing on those projects, some remedies can be seen in terms of 
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impeding the obstacles to economic development in Iraq, which was mentioned 
in the previous chapter, namely unemployment, internal migration, inflation, and 
in a broader sense, the informal economy, deterioration in social capital, and the 
insurgency. For example, agriculture, and irrigation projects are beneficial for 
increasing the employment rate, where this sector was neglected in Iraq during 
the years Saddam Hussein was in power. Thus, oil revenue dominated the main 
income of the central government. Electricity projects play a crucial role for 
increasing infrastructural development, which in turn, can be a remedy for 
unemployment. Education projects, especially, can be a future related strategy, 
which can alleviate the insurgency and crime rates that were caused mostly by 
regional discrepancies and biased ideas, as well as make future local decision-
makers open-minded. Economic, financial, and management improvement 
projects can reorganize economic and financial regulations, and rebuild 
economic disparities, which can alleviate the informal economy that is so visible 
in Iraq today. Also, the same projects can increase the employment rate in Iraq. 
Repair of damaged projects focus on repairing buildings, and ameliorating the 
social environment, thus can be a good remedy to live in a beautiful environment 
for Iraqi citizens. Protective measures especially can be a precaution against the 
insurgency and criminal gangs. Because the infrastructure sites are salient 
targets for insurgents and criminal gangs, protection of those public and private 
facilities has crucial importance regarding the development process in Iraq. 
Micro-grant projects can give opportunities to small-scale enterprises, which 
plunged into economic recession because of the lack of security and increased 
poverty in Iraq. 
Looking at the current status of the CERP projects, many of them have 
been accomplished, and those achievements are expected to be beneficial for 
the problems mentioned above. There are more than 2,400 CERP projects still in 




Table 6.   Major CERP Reconstruction Projects ($ millions) 214 
 
6. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 
In order to maintain security, increase the level of the economy, stabilize 
the political environment, reach each province’s problems easily, and create 
solution propositions, a strategic approach was needed. It is no doubt that to 
work efficiently in conflict-prone areas regarding maintaining stability and security 
is extremely difficult. So, as defined in the Fact Sheet, Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams established by Condoleezza Rice in November 2005, and their intentions 
were to engender cooperation between civil-military institutions, and maintain a 
milieu that collaborates U.S. and coalition members and local and provincial Iraqi 
governance members in a reconciling manner.215 In the inauguration of the first 
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PRT in November 2005, she said that, “these new entities would marry our 
economic, military, and political people in teams to help local and provincial 
governments get the job done.”216 Those teams are dedicated to gathering 
military and civil efforts together, and providing a secure environment for civilians 
in each province.217 The main mission of the PRTs is, “helping provincial 
governments with: developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, 
promoting increased security and rule of law, promoting political and economic 
development and providing provincial administration necessary to meet the basic 
needs of the population.”218 Therefore, it is apparent that the aftermath of the 
invasion in 2003, resulted in some regional problems, which increased especially 
after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Thus, to access each province’s 
problems and focus on their essential requirements, ad hoc remedies were 
needed at the decision-making level. In the Status of the PRT Program Extension 
Report, it was noted that, this program gave a hand to the coalition and U.S. 
forces to reach local Iraqi governments for purveying essential requirements and 
directing them in a reciprocal manner.219 Under the concept of this program, the 
PRTs focus not only on the development of economic and political areas, but 
also take precautions against the insurgency and corruption with reconstruction 
efforts.  
Looking at the shape of PRTs, they are divided into two different 
categories: Original PRTs and embedded PRTs.220 According to the Measuring 
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Stability and Security in Iraq Report, there are twenty-seven PRTs in Iraq, and 
eleven of those teams are under the U.S forces, and three of those are under the 
Coalition.221 In addition, “there are thirteen ePRTs embedded with Coalition 
forces that work on sub-provincial stability tasks in support of counterinsurgency 
operations.”222 Their structures differ from the original PRTs in that, “they are 
embedded in Brigade Combat Teams with the Brigade Commander acting as 
leader.”223 These ePRTs’ main roles are to work with the Iraqi government to 
create job opportunities, purvey essential needs, and make agreements among 
provincial, regional, tribal and municipal representatives.224 In addition to this, 
there are four Provincial Support Teams (PSTs), and they are directed remotely 
from different bases in adjacent provinces.225 They play a supportive role in 
terms of maintaining security and evaluating the provinces’ domestic problems in 
detail. According to the September 2008 report to Congress, three of those PSTs 
shifted to the original PRTs, and increased their activities and effectiveness in 
related provinces.226 
Although all these different institutions under the roof of PRT work for 
specific purposes and dichotomize in organizational type, their common objective 
is “to expand the central Iraqi government’s authority to all areas of the country 
and improve the ability of provincial authorities to deliver essential services.”227 
The lack of provincial effectiveness and access to the core of the main problems 
fostered internal precautions for a better Iraq. Looking at the emphasized areas 
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of the PRTs, five can be seen: “Governance, Rule of Law, Economic 
Development, Reconstruction, and Political Reconciliation.” 228 Each area 
focuses on required needs from different aspects, but they merge at the same 
point where a prosperous economy, secure environment and stabilized 
governance can be maintained.  
In this respect, defining the tasks of each area will be beneficial in terms of 
comparing their effectiveness against the aforementioned neglected issues at the 
decision-making level—the informal economy, deterioration in social capital, and 
the insurgency. The task of governance is to help the provincial governments 
increase their ability to a certain level for defining, evaluating, organizing, and 
purveying the essential needs of their citizens.229 This task includes citizens’ 
rights, their satisfaction in legitimacy, and effective ties among different 
governments. In this sense, those goals can be effective for alleviating the 
corruption and the insurgency. Because of the expected viable governmental 
precautions, control of corruption may easily be gained by developing the 
competency of provincial governments. 
The main tasks of the rule of law are to help government increase the 
integrity of trust and convince the citizens that, “…the police, courts, prisons, 
lawyers, and other participants on law enforcement and judicial system function 
openly and equitably to protect and serve them.”230 These implementations can 
alleviate the damaged relations among the institutions, which refers to 
“deterioration in social capital.” Alleviating crime rate, increasing social trust, 
impeding the insurgents’ attacks and punishing criminals objectively can all be 
carried out with these tasks. 
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The objective of Economic Development is to assist the economic 
development programs and expedite economic activities and investments. 
Moreover, this program gives more attention to job creation opportunities at 
provincial level, and focuses on “agriculture/agribusiness, construction, 
retail/wholesale business, industrial/commercial enterprises, and 
banking/finance”231 regarding the short and long term strategies for a better 
provincial development.232 These policies can be a beneficial remedy for 
alleviating the informal economy, which especially increased because of the lack 
of formal job opportunities and an unsecure environment. In this regard, it can be 
easy to entice foreign entrepreneurs and investors to bring in more income for 
local Iraqi citizens. 
Reconstruction efforts focus on the essential needs of Iraqi citizens in 
each province in terms of reconstruction services, identifying the solution 
propositions to the Iraqi Government, and increasing the capability of each 
province for coordinating civil construction.233 Those efforts increase the 
developments of Iraqi citizens’ social life, thus maintaining a well-organized 
social life ameliorates the morality of people. Besides, those efforts enhance the 
ability of the U.S. and Coalition forces for building effective public services 
regarding “…clean water, sewer and sanitation, and electricity.”234 
The objective of political reconciliation is to solve problems and alleviate 
escalation among conflicting parties by applying a reconciling conversation in a 
reciprocal manner, and follow the shared goals and purposes that refer to long-
term stabilization.235 More broadly, this program supports the close connection 
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among the differing institutions and groups such as “sectarian, tribal, religious, 
ethnic, civil society, military/police,”236 to lessen escalation and turmoil, and to 
rebuild trust among those institutions.237 
Finally, the following table epitomizes the funding allocated for PRTs as of 
July 2007. This table does not include the additional funding, which is purveyed 
by the agencies’ own allocations, such as personnel funding. 
 
Table 7.   PRT Program Funding238 
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October 18, 2007. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq, July 2007. 
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C. GENERAL STRATEGIC POINTS FOR THE FUTURE 
Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, many projects and plans have been 
prepared, and numerous efforts have been spent regarding a prosperous Iraqi 
economy. In this respect, achievement has been gained to some extent; 
however, the aftermath of the invasion reveals that there are lots of things to be 
done. What has been achieved as well as what went wrong, to date, should be 
scrutinized for future expectations. One of the crucial assessments by some 
observers indicates that239, in order to make predictions about the process of 
economic rebuilding, there is no “big picture,” due to the lack of adequate detail 
about the general national requirements such as “drinking water, schools, health 
care, electricity, employment.”240It is important to gather information to make a 
predictable assessment for future projects, which is also beneficial for evaluating 
the successful and unsuccessful sides of implemented projects to date. 
One of the required emphases on the Iraqi economic situation is 
controlling corruption. In this sense, the Special Inspector for Iraqi Reconstruction 
recommends that anticorruption precautions should be evaluated in comparison 
to the global experiences that have been achieved by other countries.241 In 
addition, there should be a study of the U.S. strategy’s ties with the Government 
of Iraq’s anticorruption strategy.242 In this regard, eligible personnel should fill the 
critical departments where important decisions will be made on anticorruption 
policies.243 The lack of staffing for these departments can result in squandering 
efforts and money that have been allocated for this issue. In addition, 
anticorruption efforts should be supported by adequate funding. It was argued 
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that the Embassy in Iraq does not have specifically allocated money for 
anticorruption efforts.244 Thus, when needed, the lack of funding may cause 
some operations to fail to impede corruption activities. 
Another important point that must be emphasized is the development level 
of security policies. It was recommended that until the Iraqi Government 
becomes capable of maintaining the security of main resources such as oil, 
water, electricity and gas, security plans should be developed with the Coalition 
and U.S. Forces in reciprocity.245 This issue seems to require additional projects 
and funding, due to the ongoing insurgent attacks and activities of the criminal 
gangs. Because energy security plays a vast role in terms of the development 
process, especially in a post-conflict environment, there should be highly 
evaluated projects, which can be executed in high-risk areas. Moreover, extra 
funding may be needed for unexpected situations regarding security issues. In 
this sense, it was recommended to, “develop guidance on project risk for 
managers to assess the merits of funding a project faced with security 
threats.”246 
To be successful at impeding terrorist activities and insurgent attacks, 
economic and social policies should be executed with enough funding support.247 
In this respect, to alleviate the current violence and uncertainty in Iraq, job 
creation projects should be supported by some projects such as CERP, 
Microfinance Institutions, and the Economic Support Fund. Then, social life can 
be ameliorated with increased job opportunities, and discontented youth can be 
convinced to some extent not to join an insurgent group. 
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To maintain economic stability, international assistance plays an important 
role for the future of Iraq. In this regard, one of the main objectives of the World 
Bank is “to help Iraq build efficient, inclusive, transparent, and accountable 
institutions as needed for stability, good governance, and sustainable economic 
prosperity.”248 Thus, it is apparent that international assistance handles the 
situation in an overarching approach, and establishes economic institutions and 
supports them for prosperity. In this sense, the World Bank Report notes that 
international aid is nine times more beneficial in post-conflict regions, than in 
normal regions.249 Because the main systems for maintaining basic living 
standards in a post-conflict country are mainly damaged, and to move ahead 
even an infinitesimal amount is extremely difficult, aid from outside expedites this 
process, and gives opportunity to the governmental and private sectors to build 
required institutions, and to invest money for future expectations. More broadly, it 
was recommended that to increase the effectiveness of aid, the amount should 
gradually be decreased in very small steps for the first few years, and increased 
around five years later.250 In addition, the improvements in growth affect gained 
by international aid rely on proper policies, plausible decisions by government, 
and highly educated personnel in institutions in post-conflict countries.251 In this 
respect, Iraq should evaluate its current position, and these key points should be 
implemented with the assistance of the U.S. and the Coalition forces. 
When looking for solutions economic and social problems, it is crucial to 
evaluate the “…environmental elements, human, and non-natural renewable 
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resources…”252; however, it was argued that National Development Strategy has 
been unsuccessful focusing on the critical points that should be thought through 
carefully, like economic development.253 In this respect, without building 
essential needs for the public, efforts toward economic growth will not be very 
effective. Thus, economic development projects should be implemented with the 
reconciliation of reconstruction needs in reciprocity.  
As defined in the previous chapter, precautions that will be taken to 
impede the informal economy, rely on economic improvements in the formal 
sector. Thus, the solutions for scarcity and maintaining stability in the formal 
sector reforms will then diminish the informal economy.254 For example, 
cooperation with the tribal groups will decrease the level of street vendors, and 
help diminish the informal economy, which in turn can alleviate the insurgent 
attacks.255 Because the income from the informal economy cannot be controlled 
in detail, these efforts support the insurgency and criminal gangs. Thus, the more 
the informal economy increases, the more the insurgent groups find funding for 
their illicit activities. Therefore, the limitations on enhancement of the informal 
economy can result in a prosperous formal economy. These efforts should be 
conducted with discipline, and central government officials should stick with the 
rules of formal sector development. In this respect, it was argued that, lots of 
government officials have great interest in maintaining their profitable ties to the 
informal economy.256 In addition, because of the uncontrolled corruption, price 
regulations in many fields will require much time to alleviate the effect of the 
informal economy. A typical consequence can be exemplified as, “…while gas 
prices are gradually rising as part of an International Monetary Fund, (IMF) 
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program, the impact on the shadow [informal] economy has been affected by the 
oil price differential between Iraq and its neighbors.”257  
Looking at the critical points regarding the economic suggestions in the 
financial sector, two prominent factors are noticeable: “Iraq’s relationship with the 
international financial institutions, especially the IMF, and developments in the oil 
sector, especially with regard to oil production and the disbursement of 
revenues.”258 On the financial side, the IMF pointed out the necessity of a price 
increase in petroleum productions, as well as a more flexible monetary policy, by 
enhancing the tools in order to handle liquidity conditions.259 In addition, they 
focused on the “structural reforms with regard to tax administration, payments 
and settlements systems, state-owned enterprise reconstructing, and 
governance and transparency in the oil sector.”260 However, it does not seem 
plausible for a post-conflict country to suddenly shift to a free market system and 
privatized sector. The lack of adequate job opportunities and security measures 
may transfer many unemployed Iraqis into the insurgent groups. It was argued 
that the recommendations of IMF, the World Bank and Paris Club put pressure 
on Iraq to reduce the state’s role in the economic area and rebuild the privatized 
sector.261 However, when those policies are transferred, up to 33 percent of Iraqi 
employees who are working in 192 Iraqi state firms will be unemployed, and 
these jobless citizens will find that their best choice is to join an insurgent group, 
or look for alternative ways in the informal economy sector.262 
In the financial arena, another suggestion is that, Iraq should gradually 
revoke its financial assistance for basic needs such as food and petroleum by-
                                            
257 Looney, “The Iraqi Impasse: Sustaining Economic Reconstruction During War-Time,” 28. 






products.263 This policy purveys many essential needs in very low prices to the 
Iraqi citizens. However, for an effective industrial sector development, it is 
necessary to diminish these subsidies. But, it should be remembered that, 
without a reliable “social security network,” it is extremely difficult for Iraqi citizens 
to live in an environment where basic subsidies are revoked gradually.264 Thus, 
creating a strong social security system can slow the increase of the number of 
unemployed Iraqis.  
The developments in the oil sector play significant and controversial roles 
in the Iraqi economy. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, conflict among the 
Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites increased dramatically. In an economic sense, oil 
revenue plays a vast role because it is the major income resource for the Iraqi 
citizens. However, the aftermath of the invasion in 2003 brought vague situations 
regarding the oil revenue, which should be solved to reach a stable economy and 
security in Iraq. In this regard, it is apparent that Sunnis have fears about not 
getting as much oil revenue as the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the 
south, and plunging into economic recession and poverty.265 Due to this 
uncertainty, it can be beneficial to allocate a huge amount of oil revenue directly 
to all Iraqi citizens.266 This approach can alleviate the Sunni-based insurgent 
attacks, which endanger oil revenue, and give opportunities to the small-scale 
enterprises. Moreover, this direct disbursement can encourage the Iraqi citizens 
that there is hope for the future that could lead to a better standard of living. 
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IV. CONCLUSION  
It has been more than five years since the Iraqi invasion and the point 
where the U.S stands is still uncertain. Begun with great expectations, the 2003 
invasion brought a vague situation and has not yet reached many of its goals. 
Some achievements have been made, but there are more things to be done. It is 
not easy for the Iraqi government to rebuild a viable Iraq in the short term. Thus, 
the policy that the U.S. decision makers execute should be plausible, tangible, 
convincing and fair. Means and ends should merge at the same point. Otherwise, 
political power cannot be strengthened, and political accommodation may be 
extremely difficult between Iraq and the U.S.  
Because the Iraqi economic situation is a legacy from the former Baath 
regime, managing its economy and transitioning to a prosperous level will not be 
easy. Therefore, in this thesis, the economic situation of Iraq was analyzed from 
the pre-invasion period forward. Then, beginning with the main problematic areas 
exacerbating the economic situation, Chapter II followed with three neglected 
issues—informal economy, insurgency and criminal gangs, and deterioration in 
social capital—by the U.S. government, which were emphasized in detail. 
Chapter III continued with what has been learned to date, and current policies 
executed at the local level, which include some remedies and solution 
propositions for the aforementioned three neglected issues. Then some key 
points for the future’s strategies were explained in general.  
The Baath regime exploited the oil revenues for many years while greatly 
ignoring other domestic income resources, such as infrastructure, agriculture and 
industry. Therefore, for many years, the country was tied to the oil revenue and 
the Iraqi government used this opportunity in every facet of life. The Saddam 
Hussein period, especially, was authoritarian, and social and political disparity 
remained concrete among Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish citizens. This discrimination 
throughout the country remained to date, thus the notion of a nation-state system 
has not been gained in this territory, since the1920s.  
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Being dependent on the oil revenue impeded developments of the other 
sectors of economic structure. Holding this power in hand gave Saddam Hussein 
many opportunities to lead the citizens of Iraq as he decided. However, the other 
job sectors such as agriculture, industry and infrastructure could not develop as 
required, so employment was not enhanced. Most people were trying to find a 
job related to the oil sector. This monopolized approach became the main 
obstacle for domestic prosperity, thus an imbalance of income among the 
citizens became apparent. Also, tribal loyalties maintained its importance, so 
disunity among the provinces remained strong. Thus, the legacy of the Saddam 
regime brought catastrophic problems and unequal social life to the coalition and 
U.S. forces. 
The effects of Saddam Hussein’s legacy remains to date, and because of 
that, U.S. and coalition forces met various difficulties throughout the 
implementations. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein could not alleviate turmoil, 
but exacerbated the social and economic level of country.  The post-conflict 
environment mixed with the escalation between Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish 
groups, thus the policies of the U.S. decision makers could not ameliorate social 
life to a certain extent. In this regard, many implementations have been 
executed, however, the increasing informal economy, the insurgency, and 
damage in social capital have not been considered seriously. Because of the 
informal economy, it was difficult to notice the real level of economic 
development, the main points that should be handled, and the level of 
unemployment. Because of the increasing insurgency, it was difficult to maintain 
a secure environment, build energy resources, and maintain security of high 
value public services. Moreover, this unstable milieu made it difficult to convince 
foreign entrepreneurs and investors. In this regard, U.S. decision makers have 
focused on solutions at the local level, and taken some precautions, such as 
establishing microfinance institutions, executing the Commander’s Emergency 
Response Programs, and creating Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These 
strategies at the local level, have gained measureable success, but because 
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there is no certain decision for the future plans for Iraq, these implementations’ 
results will be clear in the medium or long term. 
As discussed in Chapter III, there are many recommended strategies for 
the future of Iraq. These recommendations will be shaped by the strategy of the 
new president of the U.S. There are three approaches in this sense: 
“unconditional engagement, unconditional disengagement, or conditional 
engagement.”267 The first one is a continuation of current policy, which includes 
support to the Iraqi government, whether they implement successful policies or 
not. However, because of the disappointing consequences of this strategy to 
date, this approach does not seem to be advocated at a high rate. The second 
one is rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. This option may be assumed to 
be the easiest and the cheapest one; however, what will be left behind in this 
country is an unaccomplished job, which can create a civil war and affect the 
national interests of the U.S. in the global world. Therefore, the last one seems 
the most plausible approach, pointing to gradually transferring governmental 
issues and security precautions to the Iraqi government. This shift requires a 
well-organized strategic plan and political reconciliation and principles of stability 
in this region. This controlled role change can increase the self-trust of Iraqi 
institutions, and ameliorate the morality of the Iraqi public. The role of the U.S. in 
this regard will be an observer of ongoing policies, and assisting when needed. 
In this thesis, it became clear that the demographic shape of Iraq made it 
difficult to implement planned strategies and policies. Because three different 
groups have political, economic and social disunity, the remedies thought to be 
successful for a specific purpose may not work at the same level for all Iraqi 
citizens. Thus, that volatile environment requires initiative behaviors from the 
decision makers. Decisions and plans may be changed or updated according to  
upcoming events. This situation is related to the human factor. If eligible officers 
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are not chosen at the strategic points, to evaluate and implement required 
changes cannot be made in a limited time. If cultural differences and 
environmental difficulties are considered, it is difficult to adapt feasible changes 
to the current situation, on time. Thus, it is important to figure out the view of the 
Iraqi people, who have witnessed terrible violence and turmoil for many years, 
about the purpose of the U.S. from time of the invasion. As mentioned above, it is 
crucial to convince the Iraqi people that the purpose of the invasion was for their 
benefit, for a stable and secure Iraq. Otherwise, time and money will continue to 
be squandered for some time. Convincing people can also alleviate the violence 
and strengthen the social ties among the indigenous citizens, the U.S. and the 
Coalition forces. Then it can be easy to diminish the ongoing insurgency, to 
increase job opportunities, and to build trust networks among the institutions and 
people. But, it should be remembered that, if the Iraqi people do not believe that 
executing strategies are beneficial for their country, but only for U.S. interests, 
rebuilding efforts will not result in the expected successes. So, here comes the 
importance of asymmetric warfare. The Iraqi people can easily join different 
extremist groups or criminal gangs, or they can join any kind of illicit operation 
such as smuggling or ransom. The lack of economic prosperity, drives people to 
illegal ways, especially where security is not well maintained. Therefore, using 
the tools of asymmetric warfare, it is plausible to ameliorate the social situation in 
Iraq, and take back those people from illicit activities. To use the tools of 
asymmetric warfare, the U.S. forces should give more education to their 
personnel to teach about the culture, belief, language, life style, and point of 
views of Iraqi people in various provinces. Then it can be easy to keep in touch 
with those people in order to walk on the same path with them. With these tools, 
it can be easy to alleviate the violence and bring stability.  
Today, as we witnessed the election of a new president of the U.S., we 
know that the foreign policies of the new administration will reshape the ongoing 
strategies in Iraq. The expectations are that a controlled withdrawal will begin to 
be executed in the short and medium term. To comment on what might happen is 
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not possible now, but the economic effects of the new strategy will prove whether 
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